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COPVRIGHT DEPOSIT; 



DIGESTS OF LECTURES, 



EVENING COURSE IN ETHICS 
1912-1913 

LOYOLA COLLEGE, BALTIMORE 



TIMOTHY BROSNAHAN, S. J. 




Metropolitan Press 

JOHN MURPHY COMPANY, 

PRINTERS 

200 W. LOMBARD ST. BALTIMORE, MD. 



4 



IPermtesu Superiorly : 

Anthony J. Maas, S. J. 



•ffmprimatur : 

^ James Cardinal Gibbons 



Copyright, 1913, by 
TIMOTHY BROSNAHAN. 



Press of JOHN MURPHY COMPANY, Baltimore. 



©CI. A 850 03? 



These digests are necessarily concise. As their 
title indicates, they are merely a collection of sum- 
mary analyses of lectures delivered before one of the 
evening classes of Loyola College, Baltimore, during 
the scholastic year 1912-1913. They were multiplied 
from week to week during the year by a typewriting 
process for the class-use of those who attended the 
lectures. At the suggestion of a gentleman who 
thought well of them, they were brought together, 
and through his generosity are now put into book 
form. To him this booklet would have been dedicated 
as a mark of the writer's high regard, were it less 
insignificant than it is. 



E BRAT A. 



Page 86, line 25 — For "naturalization," read 
Nationalization." 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

The Province of Ethics 7 

The Postulates ........ 12 

The Material and Formal Objects .... 18 

The End 23 

The Good 29 

The Eight, Objective 34 

Moral Law and Conscience 39 

Merit 43 

The Sanction of Moral Law 47 

Eight, Subjective 51 

Character . . , 55 

Duties to God . . 59 

Duties in Eespect of Self 63 

Duties Eegarding Life 67 

Duties Eegarding Veracity ...... 71 

Duties to Others 75 

Eight to Material Things 79 

Socialism 84 

Monopoly 89 

Society 92 

Society, Conjugal 96 

Society, Parental . 100 

Society, Industrial 104 

Society, Civil 108 

The End of the State 112 

The Authority of the State 116 

Government, The Functions and Forms . . . 120 

The Church and State 124 

The State and Conscience 128 

International Eight . . . . . . . 132 



I.— PROVINCE. 



Ethics in a normative science, based on reason, which 
interprets a specific and paramount fact, the elements of 
which are conduct and oughtness. its province is to de- 
termine the principles by which conduct ought to be 
regulated, and in accord with which character ought 
to be formed. 



1. FACT. Every department of thought presup- 
poses some distinctive fact or aggregate of facts, 
which it reduces to a common category, and under- 
takes to explain. Ethics presupposes a fact of con- 
sciousness, viz., that by an intellectual impulse we 
are prompted to approve and commend, as having a 
specific and paramount worth, certain actions of our 
own or of other men, and to disapprove and blame 
others as wanting it. We are conscious that we 
judge some actions to be good and right and some to 
be evil and wrong, and that we ought to do the right 
and avoid the wrong. The peculiarity of this esti- 
mate is, that it is: (a) universal, applicable, and in 
fact applied, however erroneously at times, to all 
actions for which we feel we are responsible; (&) 
supreme, i. e., regulative of all other estimates; (c) 
general, i. e., characteristic of the race, and hence 
called by a name that signifies customary, i. e., eth- 
ical. We cannot deny these facts of moral conscious- 
ness without logically gainsaying every deliverance 
of reason. 



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Digests of Lectures. 



2. THE ELEMENTS OF THE FACT are (a) 
actions which we are conscious are under our con- 
trol, and for which we are responsible, i. e., conduct ; 
and (6) a necessity, which though peremptory is not 
compelling, of putting our conduct into accord with 
a standard of right, i. e., oughtness. Conduct is an 
attribute of man alone. Not all actions performed 
by man, even when peculiar to him, are conduct, for 
instance, assent to a self-evident truth. Only actions 
which spring from motive, and are consciously di- 
rected to the attainment of a purpose are conduct. 
Conduct when it becomes uniform and continuous is 
custom. The determinants of conduct, then, are the 
determinants of custom. But determinants of ac- 
tions which uniformly, constantly and generally 
affect men necessarily respond to an inner and es- 
sential demand of their nature, and conduct resulting 
therefrom exhibits the activity of that nature in its 
specific and paramount aspect. Hence customary 
conduct, which arises from an innate tendency of 
reason to discriminate between right and wrong, 
receives by historical usage the name Ethical (from 
the Greek, Ethos — a customary or characteristic 
way of acting), in order to distinguish it from cus- 
toms of an inferior kind, and to designate it as pre- 
eminently the distinctive custom of mankind. Ought- 
ness expresses a necessity which is less than the 
necessity of a physical cause, and more than the 
necessity that arises from expediency or propriety. 
It is revealed by reason as an authoritative and ab- 
solute dictate. Its necessity leaves man a respon- 
sible agent, and, therefore, physically free to respect 



Digests of Lectures. 



or contemn the imperative of reason, but volitionally 
bound to obey it. 

3. CHARACTER. Conduct uniformly in accord 
with the dictates of reason results in the formation of 
habits of conduct. A habit is a quality superin- 
duced in a faculty by repeated performance of its 
functions, giving an impulse to, and a facility in the 
exercise of its proper activity. Habits are of two 
kinds — habits of thought and habits of conduct. 
Both are acquired ; the former determines intellectual 
dispositions in a particular direction, and is the 
product of disposition and training — (appercep- 
tion) ; the latter confers ease and inclination in the 
active determination of the will to certain ends. 
Both may be good or bad. Character is the integra- 
tion of habits of conduct which individuate moral 
personality. The scope of Ethics is to determine, 
therefore, the principles by which conduct ought 
to be regulated in order that finally character may 
be rightly formed. 

4. NORMATIVE SCIENCE. Any body of truths, 
whether phenomenal or rational, co-ordinated under 
principles by which they are explained and method- 
ically formulated into a system is a science. Every 
science deals with a generic subject-matter common 
to it and other sciences. For Ethics this is conduct. 
This it views under a specific aspect and in the light 
of principles peculiar to itself. For Ethics this is 
oughtness and its principles. Sciences either inves- 
tigate the nature of things primarily for the sake 
of knowing, or estimate the meaning and value of 
things in their bearings on action. The first are 



10 



Digests of Lectures. 



speculative, the second practical. i Practical 
sciences either establish principles for the direction 
of human activities to achieving of an outer end in 
material extrinsic to man, or establish norms by 
which human activities are regulated and directed to 
the realization of an end proper to„Jand perfective 
of the nature of the faculty that -originates them. 
The latter are called normative sciences. If the 
faculty regulated is reason in its pursuits of truth, 
the science is Logic ; if it is will in its tendency to 
good, the science is ETHICS. 

5. BASED ON REASON. The principles on 
which a science is based may be either immediately 
known, or inductively inferred. In the case of a 
science of Conduct the induction would be from 
physchological experience or the facts of history and 
ethnography. The first method is intuitional, the 
second empirical. There is no logical device by 
which the validity and authority of the principle: 
"One ought to do right" can be induced from ex- 
perience. The imperatives of empirical sciences of 
conduct are at best optatives, conditional, and con- 
tingent. 

There are three classes of theories regarding the 
nature of the faculty by which ethical principles are 
immediately known: The Affective Intuitionists, 
who assert that we have a special moral faculty for 
feeling the difference between right and wrong — 
Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and in general the 
hedonistic and aesthetic schools ; the Moral Reason 
Intuitionists, who require "a faculty in kind and in 
nature supreme over all others, and which bears its 



Digests of Lectures. 



11 



own authority for being so." Butler. The Ra- 
tional Intuitionists, who hold that one or more of 
the primary principles of morality are immediately 
known to reason, which when it perceives emotive 
truths is called practical reason. 

We reject Affective Intuitionism, because (a) 
feeling is a merely passive experience, "subjectively 
subjective," as Hamilton notes, (6) it is not a special 
faculty, but a consciousness accompanying the ener- 
gizing of every faculty, (c) it varies with the indi- 
vidual, the country or the age, and deprives all moral 
truths of validity or fixity independently of the feel- 
ing mind. We reject Butler's theory because (a) a 
special faculty is superfluous, since the same intellect 
can perceive speculative and practical truth, (6) it is 
founded on a defective and superficial psychological 
analysis. 

REFERENCES: Martineau's Ethical Theories, 
Vol. II, Bk. I, Ch. I, Sect. I; Ladd's Philosophy of 
Conduct, Ch. I ; Maher's Psychology, Ch. XI and III. 
See also Hamilton's Metaphysics, Lect. XLII. 



12 Digests of Lectures. 



II.— POSTULATES. 

The fundamental postulates of Ethics are: (a) That 
God exists who made all things according to archetypal 

IDEAS, AND FOR HlS EXTERNAL GLORY ; (b) THAT MAN, HlS 
ONLY VISIBLE RATIONAL CREATURE, HAS A FREE WILL AND AN IM- 
MORTAL SOUL ; (E) THAT MAN IS ENDOWED WITH CERTAIN PRIMI- 
TIVE IMPULSES TO INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING BY WHICH 
HIS NATURE IS ADJUSTED TO THE PURPOSES OF HIS CREATION. 



1. POSTULATE, a premiss which a given science 
claims as valid without demonstrating it; not be- 
cause it cannot be demonstrated, but because the 
demonstration of it belongs to a science other than 
that which uses it. A Postulate differs from an hy- 
pothesis. Confusion in the modern acceptation of 
the term, postulate, is due to prevalent theories of 
knowledge. Every science has need of the external 
assistance of other sciences and is their debtor for 
postulates. Ethics which is concerned with the 
highest and most far-reaching activity of man must 
impetrate largely from other sciences, of which man 
is the subject. 

2. THE COSMOLOGICAL POSTULATE. Any 
ultimate explanation of the cosmos must start, either 
from sheer nothing, or sheer actuality, i. e., the 
universe either sprang from nothing and become 
what it is through some process of creative evolution, 
or it was produced by a being of sheer actuality. 
The first is untenable initially and progressively ; the 



Digests of Lectures. 



13 



second demands a being of sheer actuality from the 
fact that there is any being at all. The existence of 
universe, therefore, postulates: (a) a necessary 
self-existing being, possessing the plentitude of be- 
ing, and specifically, in a transcendent degree, the 
intellectual attributes of mind and the moral attri- 
butes of will; (5) this being is the efficient, arche- 
typal and final cause of all other beings, which are 
consequently analogues of sheer actuality; (c) such 
beings are contingent, i. e., owe nature and exist- 
ence, endurance in existence, and activity of nature 
to the Self-existing Being ; and are necessarily images 
of the Creator's archetypal ideas; (d) the Self -ex- 
isting Being bestowed existence on contingent being 
freely and for a purpose, though not from a motive ; 
(e) the only conceivable purpose of a Self -existing 
Creator is to communicate being in such a way as to 
manifest his own perfections. The Ethical import 
of these truths. 

3. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POSTULATES are : 
freedom, a logically necessary and immediate antece- 
dent of the moral act; immortality a necessary 
though remote consequence. 

4. FKEEDOM. Variety of meanings. Generi- 
cally it means immunity from necessity. Necessity 
may arise from causes extrinsic to the agent: (a) 
physical, when the agent is constrained by force to 
an action that is incongruous to native appetency, 
or restrained from an action that is congruous there- 
to — necessity of co-action; (6) emotive, when an 
end is absolutely wished, for whatever reason, the 
will, of necessity, wishes the means to the end, or 



14 



Digests of Lectures. 



when an end is authoritatively assigned by a super- 
ior, the will is subject to the necessity of conforming 
its action to the command of the superior — Emotive 
or Moral necessity. The will cannot be subject to 
the first necessity in its elicit acts; it may be subject 
to the second necessity. 

5. NECESSITY may arise from causes intrinsic 
to the agent. Inherent in every nature there is a 
tendency or motive power that specifies it. It is as 
much an attribute of intellect as it is of matter, as 
distinctive of will as of a magnet. This necessity is 
called by the Schoolmen the necessity of specifica- 
tion. It does not drive the faculty to action, but 
when tendency is actuated, it determines its specific 
functions and defines its range of operations. In 
cognitive beings the appetitive tendency is enacted 
by sensuous and intellectual apprehension. The 
necessity of actuation is had when a faculty in 
presence of its proper object duly and rightly pro- 
posed cannot withhold action. The will is always 
subject to the necessity of specification; and to the 
necessity of actuation, when the object presented to it 
is absolute good, or good without qualification. 

The cases in which freedom is claimed for the will 
are when the object, either has not and is seen not to 
have a necessary connection with the specific satis- 
faction of the will's inherent tendency to good as 
such; or if it have such a connection is presented 
through false apprehension as not having it. The 
attitude of the will towards qualified good is similar 
to the attitude of the intellect towards probable 
truth. 



Digests of Lectures. 



15 



The theory of free-will is not a theory of pure in- 
determinism. The will even when freely acting, acts 
from a motive and for a purpose. The casualty of 
motive is not reducible to the attractive power of a 
physical force; it is peculiar to the faculty that is 
moved by cognition. The will, as every faculty, 
needs the stimulation of some cause distinct from 
itself before it can act. This cause, an object present 
in consciousness, and known to be desirable, arouses 
a will-movement towards the object. This first act is 
necessary. If other and undesirable aspects of the 
known object come into consciousness (as normally 
happens, unless the will is hurried into action either 
by the suddenness with which the object is presented 
or the intensity with which it attracts) a conflicting 
will-movement away from the object is aroused. The 
will concurs or refuses concurrence with one or other 
of these movements. In this second act the will is 
not necessitated. Though it could not consent to 
either will-movement but for a motive, its consent is 
not compelled by either motive. 

6. IMMOKTALITY. The individual soul or the 
spiritual principle in man, by which he is a rational 
and a moral being, will survive the dissolution of the 
body, and continue endlessly to lead a life of intel- 
lectual and moral activity. But the soul is not im- 
mortal op its essence, as is the Creator ; it never 
ceases to be a contingent being. It is naturally im- 
mortal, in the sense that the purpose for which it 
was created, stamped on its highest faculties and ten- 
dencies, demands its conservation in endless exist- 
ence. 



16 



Digests of Lectures. 



7. THE ANTHKOPOLOGICAL POSTULATE. 
Every created being has its own mode of operation, 
and an innate inclination to perform those opera- 
tions that agree with its nature and fix its place in 
the scheme of the universe. As we ascend in the 
grade of being these modes of operation become many 
and complex; are performed by different faculties 
each having its own natural inclination. All the 
faculties of a being are radicated in the same nature; 
their inclinations are co-ordinated, with one another, 
and subordinated to a dominant inclination, which 
manifests the inclination of the unitary nature. 
This inclination of the unitary nature we call natural 
appetency. Man is a composite being in whom are 
found appetencies analogous to those characterizing 
inferior creatures; he is a microcosm. These are 
subordinated to the good of his unitary nature 
through mind, i. e., intellect and will. As each sepa 
rate faculty has its appetency for what is connatural 
to it, so his nature has its natural appetency for its 
good. 

This latter appetency manifests itself in four 
fundamental directions; (a) In common with all 
creatures, he has an inclination to resist dissolution, 
i. e., to self-preservation; (&) In common with all 
animals, he has an inclination to perpetuate his 
species, to care for and educate progeny; (c) As an 
intellectual being, he has an inclination to know the 
source and purpose of his existence; (d) As a social 
being he has an inclination to live in the communion 
of thought and endeavor with his fellowman. This 
latter inclination has universally actuated itself in 



Digests op Lectures. 



17 



three distinct natural societies; domestic, civil and 
religious ; through which the objects of the three first 
inclinations are more securely and adequately real- 
ized. 

Other inclinations of our nature are extensions, 
derivations, or complexes of these. 



18 



Digests of Lectures. 



III.— MATERIAL AND FORMAL 
OBJECTS. 

Conduct, which is the material object of Ethics, is 
volitional action, elicit or imperate, self-regarding or 

OTHER-REGARDING. It DIFFERS FROM BEHAVIOR, OR PURELY 
VOLUNTARY ACTION. OUGHTNESS, WHICH IS THE FORMAL 
ELEMENT OF ETHICS, INVOLVES AN ULTIMATE END, A SUPREME 
GOOD, AND AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT. 



1. CONDUCT, ELEMENTS OF. Action spring- 
ing from motive and consciously adjusted to an end 
is the outcome of various acts of intellect and will, 
some of which are concerned with the end, and some 
with the means conducive to the attainment of the 
end. As the intellect progressively apprehends an 
object as good in itself, as good relatively, i. e., to the 
agent, as not impossible of attainment, there respon- 
sively arises in the will the acts of liking, wish, and 
intention. These concern the end. Note the 
distinction between intention and intent, con- 
founded by Bentham, Mill and their followers. In- 
tention is a movement of the will to gain a particular 
object (in-tendere) in virtue of which it desires in 
an undefined way the means that lead to the realiza- 
tion of the end. Upon the formation of intention, 
there follows a series of acts which concern the 
means. The intellect investigates, compares and 
weighs the disparate procedures by which the inten- 
tion may be executed, with a view to deciding the 
means suitable to the end and to the agent. This act 



Digests of Lectures. 



19 



is called deliberation. It may be a prolonged or prac- 
tically instantaneous act. Through it intention is 
known to be definitely practical ; and responsive to it, 
there arises an act of the will called consent, which 
is an acquiesence in the deliberative judgment of 
reasons ; regarded as the preference of one out of many 
examined ways of proceeding it is called choice. Con- 
sent and Choice may be identical but are not neces- 
sarily so. Conduct, therefore, is defined as a free 
conative act towards a determined end, through 
choosen means. Hence, all acts of this kind, whether 
internal or external, whether self-regarding or other- 
regarding, are conduct. The measure of volition is 
the knowledge of the end and means, and advertence 
to indeliberate will movements of liking and wish. 
Any given end was a means in a prior state of ap- 
petition, chosen for the realization of a further end ; 
every good except goodness itself, can come into de- 
liberation and be a matter of choice. 

2. BEHAVIOE. Actions done from a sense of pro- 
priety or honor bear a resemblance to actions done 
from a sense of oughtness ; and as man is a social be- 
ing, social sanctions act as a direct incitement to 
moral conduct that comes or may come within the 
purview of others. But behavior is (a) judged by 
its outward conformity with certain canons of pro- 
priety, (6) conditioned on the approbation or dis- 
approbation of others, and the advantages or disad- 
vantages thence accruing, (c) varies with social en- 
vironment and standards. 

3. OUGHT. The word is employed in other than 
its Ethical sense : (a) loosely to express a conjectured 



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Digests of Lectures. 



necessity, the frustration of which is not deemed im- 
possible; (6) in an appropriated sense, to denote a 
necessity of action conditioned on expediency, pro- 
priety, or the end of a profession or social state of 
life; (c) analogously, instead of "should," to signify 
a logical necessity, or the ultimate reasonableness of 
a mode of acting. 

The "ought" of Ethics is different from any of 
these three. It is (a) certain, not conjectural, and 
objective, i. e., valid independently of the individual 
or social mind, not a subjective persuasion of a per- 
son or a community; (6) absolute, its cogency is not 
conditioned on any further purpose that we may 
have resolved on, nor contingent on inclination or 
adopted ideals — its incidence is ultimate and compre- 
hensive of cognate and implied conditions; (c) emo- 
tive, in the sense that its cogency, though perceived 
by the faculty, that is the first efficient principle in 
man of all rational action for which man is responsi- 
ble — its bond is not merely logical, i. e., on the intel- 
lect, it is also moral, i. e., on the will. "Ought" in 
this sense is the either expressed or implied "copula" 
of every Ethical judgment. Ethics, then, does 
not investigate what actually is in the past, present or 
future, but what ideally is, and actually ought to 
be, i. e., an objectively valid ideal, which ought to be 
actualized in conduct. 

4. ANALYSIS OF OUGHT. The objective, abso- 
lute and emotive necessity imposed on the will pre- 
supposes a logical necessity imposed on the intellect. 
In every Ethical judgment, therefore, is involved the 
idea of something that it is ultimately reasonable to 



Digests op Lectures. 



21 



aim at doing, of something that appeals to will as be- 
ing intrinsically and unconditionally good to do, and 
of something which practical reason cannot help 
recognizing as right to do. In the Ethical judgment, 
then, three judgments are contained: (a) that there 
is an objective and absolute end which is proper to 
action controlled by will; (6) that this end is an un- 
conditioned object of will, i. e., good, or perfective of 
the nature of which will is the appetitive faculty ; (c) 
that the necessity of attaining the end and realizing 
the good through the free actuation of will exhibits 
an ideal obligatory in character, i. e., right. These 
three conceptions, the end, the good and the right con- 
stitute the formal principle of Ethics or the specific 
aspect under which it views conduct and character. 

5. CONTENT OF OUGHT. Ought, therefore, im- 
plies a twofold canon of morality : one incomplete, 
which furnishes a rule by which the worth of con- 
duct — i. e., its conformity with the end and the good 
— is discerned; and another complete, comprising 
the first, and adding the idea of law prescribing 
right and proscribing wrong conduct. A rule is 
practical in respect of matter and speculative in 
mode ; a law is practical in respect of matter and in 
mode. The notion of "ought" contains the idea 
both of rule and law. Any system of Ethics that 
ignores the latter element in its content is not conp 
petent to explain the Ethical Fact. 

6. SUMMARY. We have seen: (a) That Ethical 
means what is customary to the race, (6) that the 
customary is uniformly recurrent conduct, (c) that 
conduct uniformly recurrent conforms to some norm, 



22 Digests of Lectures. 

(d) that this norm exhibits an universally perceived 
and accepted rule and law, (e) that "ought" is the 
expression of this norm, (/) that conduct habitually 
conformed to this norm produces a type of moral per- 
sonality, called character. The subjects of General 
Ethics are, therefore, Conduct, the End, the Good, 
the Eight and Character. 

REFERENCES : Rickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. 
I, question 6, p. 40 ; question 12, p. 52 ; question 13, 
p. 53. Ladd's Philosophy of Conduct, Chs. 4 and 5, 



Digests of Lectures. 23 



IV. — THE END. 

The absolutely ultimate intrinsic end of man's voli- 
tional ACTIVITY IS BLESSEDNESS, OR THE FINAL PERFECTION OF 
HIS RATIONAL NATURE WITH THE HAPPINESS CONSEQUENT 
THEREUPON. THROUGH NO FINITE OBJECT OR COMBINATION OF 
FINITE OBJECTS IS BLESSEDNESS OBTAINABLE, BUT ONLY BY THE 
PERFECT KNOWLEDGE AND PERFECT LOVE OF GOD. 



1. THE END. In its primary meaning end signi- 
fies the terminal part of a material object; thence 
by analogy, (a) the close and outcome of a contin- 
ued operation, (&) the result of conative activities 
foreseen before achievement, (c) the mental represen- 
tation of this result as desirable, and as inducing to 
action. In the last sense end is a final cause, i. e., 
that for the sake of which and on account of which 
anything is done. Looked at as that which induces 
to action it is motive, as the object or state which the 
action is intended to attain it is purpose. Motive 
and purpose are correlative for created wills. The 
uncreated will acts for a purpose, but not from a 
motive. And end is, therefore, that which is desir- 
able in itself ; or that on account of which or for the 
sake of which anything is done. 

2. DIVISION OF ENDS. An end is desirable in 
itself, but at the same time may be a means to a more 
desirable object; hence, we distinguish immediate, 
intermediate and ultimate ends. An ultimate end 
may be relatively so, i. e., within a certain sphere of 



24 



Digests op Lectures. 



activity, or absolutely so, i. e., for the whole uncon- 
ditional range of volitional activity. Again we dis- 
tinguish between the end of the action, or the re- 
sult in which the action of its nature terminates, and 
the end of the agent, or the purpose which the ac- 
tion is made to subserve by the free will of the agent. 
These may be identified : but for finite intellects and 
defectible wills they may be distinct and incongruous. 
Furthermore, we distinguish between the intrinsic 
end of a nature, i. e., an end realizable within the na- 
ture itself through the attainment of the fullest de- 
velopment and perfection of which it is capable ; and 
the extrinsic end., i. e., an end outside of the nature, 
to which its final state of perfection is ordained by the 
Author of nature. The two ends are essentially re- 
lated. The extrinsic end of man we learn from the 
Cosmological Postulate is the extrinsic glory of God. 

3. NATURE AND END. The intrinsic end of a 
nature is known from its appetencies ; either by find- 
ing a resultant tendency or a dominant tendency, 
which exhibits the final tendency; the first impossi- 
ble, since man's nature is composite and of hetero- 
geneous parts, i. e., matter and spirit; the second 
alone possible. Man's tendencies may be classed 
under two heads ; the apprehensive or cognitive ten- 
dencies, and the appetitive or conative tendencies. 
The object of a faculty rightly presented rouses the 
mind to some sort of activity; its tendency, before 
potential, becomes actuated. In every mental act 
a relation between the mind acting and the object of 
the act is established. This relation is either recep- 
tive, bringing the object vicariously into conscious- 



Digests of Lectures. 



25 



ness, or is subsequent to the psychical presence 
of the object in consciousness, and is active 
in its attitude to the object. By the first 
the object is known, by the second sought. Now 
the first is the condition and measure of the 
second; the second is the completion and ratio es- 
sendi of the first. By the first we know, by the sec- 
ond we do. The final tendency of the nature, there- 
fore, is found in his appetitive tendency, and in the 
obect of this is discerned his end. But this is the 
higher or rational appetency, i. e., will, to which his 
lower or sensuous appetency is of its nature subordi- 
nated. 

The adequate and appropriate object of will is 
goodness — this by the necessity of specification. In 
every elicit act while freely moved by the desirability 
of a particular object, it is necessarily moved by a 
common and comprehensive ground of appetibility, 
i. e., goodness. 

Blessedness on its subjective side is the complete 
satisfaction of the rational desire that expresses the 
final tendency of human nature. The objective 
ground of this satisfaction includes {a) perfect well- 
being of life and activity, and (6) the full and unal- 
loyed happiness that arises form perfect well-being. 
Neither can be had apart from the other. The dis- 
sensions among schools of Ethics regard the logical 
or ontological priority of one or the other. Blessed- 
ness then is a state of existence in which (a) man 
possesses the full measure of well-being for which he 
has a capacity, or in other words, the final perfection 
of his rational nature; (&) and enjoys an abiding 



26 



Digests op Lectures. 



pleasureable consciousness arising from the fact that 
supreme tendencies energize in the full possession of 
their object, or in other words, final happiness. A 
corollary of blessedness is that it should be stable 
and unending. It could be subject to change only 
in the supposition that the capacity of human nature 
for blessedness (a) could be continuously and pro- 
gressively enlarged, or (&) could be finally dimin- 
ished. Both suppositions untenable. If terminable, 
the blessed (a) either know it, (6) are in doubt re- 
garding it, or (c) are ignorant of it. Any of these 
suppositions vitiate blessedness. 

4. PROOF. The absolutely last end of man's voli- 
tional activity is known first from the innate ten- 
dency of the will to its adequate and appropriate ob- 
ject, since this is, as it were, the essential gravitation 
of the faculty towards that for which it has capacity 
and need, and which reciprocally adequately responds 
to the one and fully satisfies the other. But the 
state that responds to the innate appetence of will 
must be one in which the full ground of appetibility 
is realized, or all goodness that responds to the ra- 
tional desire of will. Now, this is complete well-be- 
ing or final perfection, and the final happiness con- 
sequent thereupon. 

It is known secondly from the elicit appetence or 
the innate appetence actuated in regard to a particu- 
lar object. The formal element in desire, qua desire, 
is the natural inclination of the will towards an ob- 
ject that shall be repletive of its innate tendency. 
Therefore, in every actual volition the fullness of 
well-being is either explicitly or implicitly sought. 



Digests of Lectures. 



2? 



This is confirmed by the experience of our inner life. 
We pursue objects of desire, but possession does not 
bring surcease of desire ; we are occupied with some 
interest, but no measure of success brings permanent 
content. Kational desire can never be sated except 
in the attaining of a state of existence co-extensive 
with the good for which the will has capacity and 
need; but its capacity and need are measured by 
range of the intellect's power of conceiving. 

This state is attainable, i. e., happiness cannot be 
an infinite progress to a state of existence or of per- 
fection eternally in advance of any given grade of 
attainment. 1. The divine wisdom would be in con- 
tradiction with itself, if it implanted in our nature 
a tendency to a goal that could never be reached. 
2. The divine veracity would belie itself, if the prom- 
ises which the tendency reveals were false; a mere 
lure to lead us on. 3. The divine goodness would de- 
feat its own purpose, if man, through the faculties by 
which he excels the brutes, were rendered more 
wretched than they. 

5. THE OBJECT. Since the adequate object of 
the intellect is truth as such, and the object of the 
will is good as such, the final perfection and happi- 
ness of his nature will consist in a knowledge and 
love, commensurate with his capacity, of an object, 
which is supreme truth and supreme goodness. This 
is God and God only. 

Finite objects are: (a) Goods op fortune — but 
these are extrinsic and instrumental; are acquired 
or lost independently of merit; are of an inferior 
kind, (b) Goods of the body — but these are com- 



28 



Digests op Lectures. 



mon to us and the brutes; are unsatisfying, in the 
absence of goods of fortune ; like these are possessed 
or lost without relation to moral life, (c) Goods op 
the soul, as knowledge, love and virtue — but these 
are formal, not objective goods; their capacity for 
rendering blessed depends on the capacity of the 
objects with which they are concerned for adequately 
satisfying man's final tendency. Nor can they sat- 
isfy in combination, first because some of them are 
incompatible, and secondly, because each is insuffi- 
cient, not quantitatively only, but qualitatively also. 

KEFEKENCES: Kickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. 
I, questions I-V. 



Digests of Lectures. 29 



V. — THE GOOD. 

Good is perfective, delectable and useful. Man's su- 
preme good is EUDAIMONIA, or the attainment of his ab- 
solutely ULTIMATE INTRINSIC END. THE PROXIMATE NORM OF 
GOODNESS IS RATIONAL NATURE LOOKED AT IN ITSELF AND IN 
ALL ITS ESSENTIAL RELATIONS | THE ULTIMATE NORM IS THE DI- 
VINE Nature as known to the Divine Practical Reason. 
The determinants of Goodness are the end of the action, 
the end of the agents and modifications intrinsically 
affecting either. 



1. GOOD. The notion of good presented a poster- 
iori is that which satisfies appetence. Rational ap- 
petence (with which we deal), involves a relation of 
the faculty to an object, the ground of which is want 
on the part of the faculty and on the part of the 
object fitness to appease want. The latter ground 
constitutes the goodness of the object. An object is 
good, not because it is likable or desirable, but in- 
versely. Good, therefore, is an attribute intrinsic to 
an object by which it is fitted to satisfy appetence. 
A volitional act is good when it is fitting to the ra- 
tional agent. 

2. CLASSIFICATIONS, (a) Want arises from 
the absence of a perfection which the agent needs, 
from the presence of an imperfection which is dis- 
cordant to the agent, or from the absence of a per- 
fection to which the agent aspires. Want compre- 
hends more than need. The good that satisfies this 
want is perfective good. Concomitant with and 



30 



Digests of Lectures. 



arising from the absence of desired perfection or the 
presence of undesired imperfection there is a con- 
sciousness of dissatisfaction ranging from mere dis- 
content to pain. This want is a psychological symp- 
tom of the primary want. The relief of it becomes 
an object of appetence. The good that brings this re- 
lief is delectable good. Like the affective state that 
it replaces it may vary from mere assuagement of 
unpleasant feeling to the glow of delight, depending 
on the energizing of the faculty through which per- 
fective good is obtained. Lastly, an object is good 
when it is a pure means to the attainment of perfec- 
tive and delectable good, i. e., when the ground of its 
desirability is wholly extrinsic to it, and outside of 
its usefulness it is not desirable. This is useful 
good. Perfective good is good in itself and of it- 
self ; delectable good is good in itself but not of it- 
self ; useful good is good neither in itself, not of it- 
self, but as a means to perfective or delectable good. 
Everything that is desired is desirable on one or more 
of these three grounds. (6) There are as many sorts 
of goods as there are specific wants to be satisfied. 
Man's wants are as numerous as are the contacts of 
his many-sided nature with reality. His primary 
want is for that which sets desire at rest ; this is per- 
fective good. But perfective good may befit the uni- 
tary nature as such, or some faculty in subordination 
to it ; or it may befit a faculty out of subordination 
to the nature. The former is real good, which when 
it superadds a relation to the norm of volitional ac- 
tivity is called moral good. The latter is apparent 
good. Distinguish two meanings of "desirable;" 
Eudaemonism. The word happiness is usually ac- 



Digests of Lectures. 



31 



cepted as the English equivalent of the Aristotelian 
term ; but erroneously, since this would confound it 
with Hedonism. The supreme good of man is: (a) 
a well-being of life and its activities, (&) which is 
desirable in itself always, and never on account of 
anything else, (c) which suffices man in all his es- 
sential relations and is outside of comparison with 
other goods, (d) which is to be found in his distinc- 
tive and specific functions, i. e., in the activity of his 
rational life. This is edaemonia, i. e., the highest 
energizing of his rational life in conformity with the 
laws of its excellence, and the essential delight fol- 
lowing thereon. 

3. THE PROXIMATE NORM. The norm is 
that by conformity with which an action or object of 
volition takes on the attribute of goodness ; it is dis- 
tinguished from a criterion of goodness by which 
conformity to norm is known and tested. The dif- 
ference between good and evil is objective, i. e., inde- 
pendent of the moral agent, and intrinsic, i. e., the 
concept of good essentially excludes the concept of 
evil. The distinction does not arise from custom or 
education, nor from the free will of God. But an 
objective and intrinsic difference between good and 
evil necessarily involves a norm by which these 
generic types are essentially fixed. 

The fitting perfection of an agent is its good. The 
norm of its perfection, therefore, is the norm of its 
goodness. But the proximate norm of man's perfec- 
tion is his rational nature in so far as it is the pri- 
mary principle by which his actions are produced, 
and the immediate subject modified by them. This 



313 



Digests of Lectures. 



principle and subject adequately considered is: (a) 
a composite nature, in which faculties and functions 
are mutually adjusted and subordinated to rational 
will — an individual order; (6) a social nature, allied 
by innate impulse, needs and destiny with other 
social natures — an order op rights and duties; (c) 
a contingent nature, owing origin and continued 
existence to the Creator, and its meaning and value 
to his design — an universal order. 

4. THE ULTIMATE NORM. The objective, in- 
trinsic and absolute difference between good and evil 
necessarily involves a norm of morality, which is 
original and ultimate. The only norm of this kind is 
the Supreme Nature, which is at once the source of 
his nature, and archetypal of it. Now this is the 
Divine nature, first as the efficient cause of all con- 
tingent natures, and secondly as the archetypal 
cause of all grades of analogous being, which are re- 
lated to it as an exemplar, and have reality in so far 
as they represent in diverse stages of finite being, 
in resemblances or traces, the Infinite Being. See 
Digest II, the Cosmological Postulate. 

5. THE DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY. 
Good as well as evil actions differ in kind. Good ac- 
tions are different in their special relations of con- 
formity to the norm of morality, and endue the will 
with distinctive perfections; and inversely evil ac- 
tions. They are differentiated first by the end or 
result in which the volitional act whether elicit or im- 
perate normally issues. The end of the action may 
be in conformity with the natural purpose of the 
faculty from which it proceeds, either positively or 



Digests of Lectures. 



33 



negatively: positively, when it is so in accord with 
the nature of the agent, that its alternative is in dis- 
cordance — the action is good; negatively, when 
neither the end of the action nor its alternative is out 
of accord with the nature of the agent — the action is 
indifferent. Difformity with the natural purpose 
of the faculty or nature of the agent makes the ac- 
tion bad. But every will-movement is objectively 
specified by the result in which it normally issues. 
They are differentiated secondly by the end of the 
agent when distinct from the end of the action, which, 
though extrinsic to the end of the action, falls with- 
in the compass of the integral volitional act. The 
reason is the same ; the end of the agent is the pur- 
pose of the elicit will-movement. Circumstances, 
lastly, which intrinsically modify either the end of 
the action or the end of the agent, and have moral 
bearings, also specify the morality of the action. An 
action is good when the three causes to which it owes 
its specific morality are good, evil if one of these is 
evil. Material and Formal morality. 

REFERENCES : Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. I, ques- 
tions XVIII-XX, p. 55, ff, Cronin, Science of Ethics, 
Ch. 3. 



34 



Digests of Lectures. 



VI.— OBJECTIVE RIGHT. 

The right objectively consideeed is an ideal of conduct 
obligatory in character. obligation arises from moral 
law. Moral law is imposed on us by the Divine Will, 
and promulgated by the light of reason ; and presuppos- 
ing the decree of creation, the act of the dlvine wlll 
imposing the moral law is necessary, universal and im- 
MUTABLE. 



1. EIGHT. The term is derived from a root 
(rego) meaning that which is kept straight. It ap 
plies primarily to the movement of a material body 
towards a goal without deflections in lateral direc- 
tions. By natural extension of meaning it applies to 
movements of a higher kind, viz., of intellect and will. 
E. g., right reasoning, right conduct. It connotes an 
ideal norm, which determines the aim of the move- 
ment and keeps it within its proper boundaries 
Wrong (WRUNG=twisted) gives the same evidence. 
The necessity imposed by the norm is appropriate to 
the nature of the faculty. For free-will it is moral 
necessity or obligation. The term right, therefore, 
may be used in three senses : (a) an ideal of conduct 
obligatory in character, i. e., objective right; (5) 
that which conforms to the ideal ; (c) a moral faculty 
inviolable by force of the ideal, i. e., subjective right. 

2. OBLIGATION. The concept of obligation 
involves three relations : one who obliges — a subject 
obliged — and that to which the subject is obliged. 



Digests of Lectures. 



35 



Formally, then, obligation is a necessity, known by 
reason, of positing or omitting an act, which has an 
intrinsic connection or opposition with an ultimate 
end and an absolute good, imposed by one having au- 
thority. 

3. LAW primarily signifies a rule of action, man- 
datory in form, established and promulgated by a 
competent authority for the common good; deriva- 
tively, an intrinsic necessity physically compelling 
to uniform action; and loosely the observed uni- 
form sequence of phenomena, or the formal state- 
ment of such uniformity in a given class of cases. 
In the first sense law imposes a bond on the will in 
keeping with the nature of the will ; in the second it 
is a physical necessity inherent in the nature of 
things; and in the third a formulated necessity of 
uniformity in phenomenal sequence. Law is Ethi- 
cal, physical or theoretical. Ethical law must 
be promulgated to be obligatory. It is promulgated 
orally or by writing if positive, e. g., civil and ec- 
clesiastical law ; or it is revealed by reason if moral 
law. 

4. MORAL LAW. The moral necessity inherent 
in law is imposed by self, by one's equal, or by 
one's superior. The first empties the concept of ob- 
ligation of all content; one cannot have authority 
over oneself and be subject to oneself in the same re- 
spect. The control of reason, and of will over lower 
faculties is not authoritative. Kant's distinction be- 
tween the noumenal and phenomenal man, and the 
subjection of one to the other is futile. The second 
is untenable ; as moral beings, all men are equal, and 



36 



Digests of Lectures. 



no man or body of men has original jurisdiction over 
another man or can bind him in conscience. Such 
jurisdiction as they have must be derived from an 
authority that is superior to them and their subjects. 

5. MORAL LAW EXISTS. Season makes known 
to us a moral law: (a) that between good and evil 
actions there is a difference which is intrinsic to the 
nature of things, which is founded in the three es- 
sential relations of man, i. e., to self, to others, and 
to the Creator, which consequently arises from a 
necessary connection or opposition to man's ultimate 
end and absolute good ; ( b ) that the former are un- 
conditionally prescribed and the latter in like man- 
ner prohibited. These imperatives of reason have 
the attributes of law; they are universal, i. e., ex- 
perienced by all men; objective, i. e., not produced, 
but perceived by reason ; constant, i. e., independent 
of the variations of times, places and persons. There- 
fore there is a moral law. But it must exist some- 
where. It cannot exist in material things; it can 
exist nohow or nowhere but in a Mind. An absolute 
and objective moral law must exist in a Mind which 
is the source and archetype of whatever is true in 
our moral judgments. The true in our moral judg- 
ments is the expression of our essential relations to 
reality. Therefore, the absolute moral ideal of right 
exists in a mind that is the source of all reality, other 
than itself. 

6. THE SOUKCE OF MORAL LAW. Though in 
form law is an ordination of superior reason direct- 
ing subject reason, it is in effect a necessit} r put by a 
superior will on a subject will to follow the direction 



Digests of Lectures. 



37 



of the ordinating reason. An act of legislation, 
therefore, is from reason presupposing an act of will 
in virtue of which it directs and moves through rea- 
son. The source of moral law, therefore, is the Will 
of a being which is the source of all reality, and 
which has supreme authority over every created will 
— the Divine Will. 

7. THE DIVINE WILL IMPOSED MORAL LAW 
NECESSARILY. All law supposes subjects or a 
community. Logically prior to the decree of Crea- 
tion, there could be no subjects of moral law. The 
Divine Will imposing moral law presupposes, there- 
fore, the decree of Creation. Now God was free to 
create or not create, but having decreed to create, He 
must necessarily create beings, which in varying de- 
grees of perfection were analogues of His Divine 
Essence and Nature. But such being must be in 
nature vestigial or imitative manifestations of the 
Divine activity, and have modes of operations which 
are to be conformed to the archetypal ideas of God. 
Therefore the Divine Will, supposing the decree of 
Creation, necessarily willed that all creatures should 
act in accord with their natures, necessarily if they 
are irrational, freely if they are rational. The Moral 
Law, or the decree of the Divine Will obliging all 
free agents to act in a defined way, is necessary, uni- 
versal and immutable, since it is on God's part the 
expression of the Divine Practical Reason, and on 
Man's part written in his reason in so far as that rea- 
son is an analogue of Divine Reason. 

REFERENCES: Rickaby's God and His Crea- 
tures, Bk. II, Ch. 41-46 ; Cronin's Science of Ethics, 



38 



Digests op Lectures. 



Ch. XIX, pp. 597-612; Newman's Grammar of Assent, 
Ch. 5, Sect. 1 ; Kant's Ethics, Abbott's Translation, 
p. 321 ; Kashdall's Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, 
pp. 206-216. 



Digests op Lectures. 39 



VII.— MORAL LAW AND CON- 
SCIENCE. 

SO FAR AS ITS FIRST PRINCIPLES ARE CONCERNED THE MORAL 
LAW IS KNOWABLE TO ALL WHOSE REASON IS DEVELOPED. CON- 
SCIENCE, OR REASON WHEN IT APPLIES THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 
MORAL LAW TO INDIVIDUAL ACTS, IS TO BE OBEYED WHEN IT IS 
PBUDENTIALLY CERTAIN | AND WHEN IT IS IN DOUBT RECOURSE 
MUST BE HAD TO REFLEX PRINCIPLES AFFORDING CERTAINTY BE- 
FORE ACTION BECOMES LAWFUL. 



1. FIRST PRINCIPLES. Principles of the Moral 
Law are practical truths, i. e., they affirm an ideal of 
conduct, and an obligation of acting in accord with it. 
So far as the ideal of conduct is affirmed they are of 
the same character as speculative truths; as an 
affirmation of obligation they have motive power on 
the will. A truth is immediately evident when it can 
be known without the medium of reasoning. Such 
a truth is necessarily knowable to all who apprehend 
the meaning of the terms. Truths of conduct are of 
three kinds: (a) those universal and ultimate truths, 
which neither need, nor are capable of demonstra- 
tion; (6) truths which by an easy and obvious infer- 
ence are deduced by the application of ultimate 
truths to specific cases of right and wrong; (c) 
truths inferred by more or less difficult processes of 
reasoning. 

2. KNOWABLE. Reason is as subject to limita- 
tions in regard to practical as to speculative truths. 



40 



Digests of Lectures. 



It may receive different degrees of development, and 
may be perverted. Moral education is as necessary 
for moral development of reason as is other kinds of 
education for the development of reason in other de- 
partments of thought. Primary principles of con- 
duct cannot be unknown, nor is the intellect subject 
to error in their regard. Secondary principles may 
be obscured in their particular application by defec- 
tive or perverted moral education, or by apparent 
conflict between them. Tertiary principles may 
themselves be unknown in various degrees, and by 
particular persons, even in a developed moral envi- 
ronment. 

3. DIFFICULTIES may be solved: (a) by distin- 
guishing between the extension of a command and 
prohibition of the moral law; (6) by distinguishing 
between the law which is unchangeable and the mat- 
ter of the law which may vary. Difficulties from 
ethnography may be solved: {a) by showing that 
facts were observed in the light of preconceived the- 
ories, or by disproving through later research the nar- 
ratives of earlier travellers ; (&) by showing that bar- 
barian people have erred through defective or per- 
verted moral education with regard to remote and 
difficult inferences from primary and secondary prin- 
ciples, or in the application of the latter to particular 
cases; (c) by not reading into their actions the view- 
point of civilized people. Inferences, sometimes 
made, that our morality in its higher aspect is con- 
ventional, because lower or degraded races do not 
know it, are invalid. Error is subjective, and even 
when general does not invalidate objective truth. 



Digests of Lectures. 



41 



4. CONSCIENCE. Conscience is spoken of as a 
witness, a judge, a monitor. In its basic meaning 
it is the faculty which, by applying principles of mor- 
ality to particular cases, gives individual promulga- 
tion to the moral law. This faculty is reason. The 
reasoning by which the individual dictates of mor- 
ality are reached may be correct or erroneous, cer- 
tain or doubtful. The doubt may regard the law or 
the fact; it may be rational or emotional. When 
doubt is rational, the probability of reason's conclu- 
sions may be slight or solid. If solid enough to 
justify a normally prudent man in action, it is said 
to be prudentially certain. 

5. CONSCIENCE AS A GUIDE, (a) To act, 
when conscience is doubtful regarding the morality 
of an act or its omission, is to act with a prudent 
fear that the act or its omission is immoral, and to 
deliberately expose oneself to the danger of doing 
what is objectively wrong. This is to incur moral 
guilt. (6) Conscience is the subjective norm of in- 
dividual morality, since it is the promulgation of 
the moral law for individual action. When cer- 
tain therefore, whether it be correct or erroneous, it 
must be obeyed, (c) Prudential certainty suffices 
for action, since in the individual affairs of practical 
life it is generally the only certainty that can be had, 
and since it is prudential, (d) Before action one 
must be prudentially certain that the moral law con- 
cretely applies to the individual act; otherwise one 
acts with a doubtful conscience. 

6. CERTAINTY THROUGH REFLEXIVE 
PRINCIPLES. If doubt persists after investigation, 



42 



Digests of Lectures. 



two cases may occur, (a) The doubt regards the ex- 
istence of the law or the comprehension of the 
individual case under the law, and neither alter- 
native of conduct imperils the certain rights of 
others. (6) Or the doubt regards the means neces- 
sary for fulfilling the law or of safeguarding the 
rights of others. In the first case, the law, whether 
as self-regarding or other-regarding, is doubtful. 
And as we may not posit an action or omit it, when 
conscience is doubtful, so we are not bound when 
moral obligation is doubtful. Prudential certitude 
therefore regarding the lawfulness of an act or its 
omission may be had by appealing to the principle : 
a doubtful law does not oblige. In the second 
case, as the law is certain, of alternative means 
that is to be chosen which will more probably secure 
the observance of the law. Prudential certainty may 
be had by invoking the principle: in doubt the 

SAFER PART IS TO BE CHOSEN. 

Morbid conditions of conscience are laxity, scru- 
pulousness and perplexity. Their cure varies with 
their causes which may be intellectual, emotional, or 
physiological. No general rules can be safely pre- 
scribed for the self-guidance of such consciences. 

EEFEEENCES : Eickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. 
I, p. 281, question XCIV, and p. 303, question C. Art. 
5 and 8 ; Cronin's Science of Ethics, Chs. 14 and 16 ; 
Eashdall's Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, p. 84 
(ii.), and Vol. II, p. 356, Ch. 4, and p. 414, Ch. 5. 
What is said on pp. 430, 431 and 432 may be dis- 
counted until further investigation. Lea who is 
quoted is utterly unreliable ; Pascal is a partisan of 
the Port-Eoyalists. 



Digests of Lectures. 



43 



VIII.— MERIT. 

Man may truly merit with God, though the merit that 
obtains from man to god is not of the same kind as that 
which obtains between man and man. 



1. MEKIT. In common usage the word is applied 
to actions deserving reward, and the word demerit to 
those deserving punishment. Absolutely taken it 
simply means desert either in a favorable or unfavor- 
able sense. It may be denned as the quality of a 
volitional act having a beneficial or detrimental bear- 
ing on another person by reason of which the agent 
deserves recompense or requital. An act may de- 
serve reward or punishment on two grounds: (a) 
because it is entitled to a reward, or punishment is in 
justice due to it; or (b) because it is appropriate 
that it should be rewarded or punished. The first is 
condign merit or merit by right ("condign" in pres- 
ence usage is generally confined to punishment), the 
second is congruous merit, or merit by worth. 

2. MEKIT BETWEEN MEN. Confining the term, 
for the sake of the brevity, to its favorable sense, 
merit by right as it obtains between man and man, 
requires the verification of these conditions: (a) The 
one meriting should have conferred a benefit on the 
one with whom he merits, (b) There must have been 
a pact or formal agreement between the two regard- 
ing the benefit to be conferred and the reward to be 
given; otherwise only merit of worth is had; (c) 



44 



Digests of Lectures. 



There must be a proportion of equality between the 
action and its reward; (d) Prior to the payment of 
the reward there must exist a disproportion in the 
order of justice between the person meriting and the 
person benefitted by reason of which the latter is a 
debtor and the former is a creditor, and which can be 
removed only by giving the reward due. (e) The 
person rewarding is deprived of that by which he 
pays the reward. It is to be noted that the presence 
of merit by right is not prevented by the fact that 
the action is already due on other grounds than those 
of an onerous condition fixed by pact and fulfilled. 
The action may be due on grounds of benevolence, 
filial piety, equity, and yet be meritorious because of 
the conditions fixed by agreement. 

Imperfections or limitations are implied in all 
these conditions of merit as it obtains between man 
and man, and, therefore, this merit cannot be of the 
same kind as that which obtains from man to God. 
(a) To receive a benefit implies a want; there can be 
no want in God. (6) To enter into a formal agree- 
ment implies that both parties may be subject to 
obligation, and, therefore, to a law superior to them. 
But God is not subject to obligation and is not bound 
by law. (c) That there should be a proportion of 
equality between the action and its rewards implies 
that there is no intrinsic dependence of the one merit- 
ing on the one with whom he merits. But man can 
in nowise be independent of God. (d) The state 
of being a debtor to another entails limitations in the 
creditor. But God cannot be limited by any action 
of his creature. Logically prior to any promise of 



Digests of Lectures. 



45 



reward our actions are due to God, either because 
they fall under the commandments or under the 
counsels, either in justice or in pietate. (e) It 
would be an imperfection in God, if by giving the re- 
ward his possessions were diminished. 

3. MERIT WITH GOD. There is true merit in 
both cases, but in an intrinsically analogous sense. 
Hence the conditions can be analogously verified. 
(a) It is within the power of our free-will to give 
God formal extrinsic glory. (~b) There is implanted 
in our soul a natural promise that ultimate well-be- 
ing and happiness will be the reward of a moral life. 
Hence the Creator is necessitated by His own attri- 
butes of sanctity, wisdom and justice to give us the 
eudaemonistic completion of our nature, when in its 
activity it has been in conformity with the archetypal 
ideals and norms of nature, (c) There a proportion, 
not of equality, but of teleology between our actions 
and their eternal reward, i. e., the proportion that 
exists between a nature and the final state in which 
its activities naturally issue, (d) Our reward is not 
due until the end of probation. Hence payment is 
not deferred, but awaits ultimate fitness for its re- 
ception, (e) By giving the reward God does not 
diminish his own possessions, since the reward is 
union with himself; a friend loses nothing by be- 
stowing friendship on one meriting it. 

Now, man can put many actions which (a) are 
volitional, imputable and give formal glory to God. 
(&) being in conformity with the archetypal norms 
of conduct, of their nature require the ultimate per- 
fection of a rational being — which is its reward, (c) 



46 



Digests of Lectures. 



by the natural promise impressed on the faculties of 
the soul are necessarily accepted by God as being 
meritorious. But in actions of this kind the essential 
conditions of merit are verified. Man can, therefore, 
truly merit with God. 

REFERENCES : Rickaby, God and His Crea- 
tures, Bk. II, Ch. 29 ; S. Theol. 1, 2, question 114, A. 1. 



Digests of Lectures. 
IX.— SANCTION. 



47 



The perfect sanction appertaining to the moral law, 
which is the realization or frustration of the final 
perfection of man's rational nature, is obtainable only 
in a future life. 



1. SANCTION. The term is used either to desig 
nate the decree of the lawgiver by which rewards or 
penalties are apportioned for the observance or vio- 
lations of the law, or to designate these rewards or 
penalties themselves. The primary intrinsic pur- 
pose of sanction is to induce to the observance of law 
or to dissuade from the violation of it. The sec- 
ondary intrinsic purpose is the re-adjustment 
through reward or punishment of the objective order 
of justice. The first purpose is emotive, i. e., moves 
the will to observe the law or avoid the violation of 
it; the second is effective subsequently to the obser- 
vance or violation of the law and independently of 
volition on the part of the subject of the law. With 
regard to premial sanction there is no controversy; 
penal sanction has been challanged by atheistic ra- 
tionalism. Its vindicative character is regarded as 
vindictive. But primarily it is preservative, second- 
arily, i. e., subsequent to the volitional act it is vin- 
dicative. The lawgiver does not will punishment as 
an evil to the subject, but as a reparation of order; 
nor can the preservative character of sanction be re- 
tained, if its vindicative character is denied. 



48 



Digests op Lectures. 



2. CLASSIFICATION OF SANCTIONS. Sanc- 
tions are either natural or positive, arising, namely, 
as the natural outcome of actions or imposed by the 
free-will of the legislator; adequate or inadequate, 
according as they are or are not of themselves suffi- 
cient to move a rational will to observe the law; 
proportioned or unproportioned, according as they 
are fully or are only partially adjusted to the merit 
of observing the law or the demerit of violating it. 

A perfect sanction is one that is adequate and pro- 
portioned. 

3. ORDER OF SANCTIONS. Natural Sanctions 
are found in three orders. In the individual order, 
which consists in the subordination of the lower ap- 
petites to the dictates of right reason, the sanctions 
are approval or remorse of conscience, the enjoyment 
or loss of mental or bodily health. In the social 
order, which consists in the essential relations of 
man to his fellowman, the sanctions are the social 
good or evil that follow upon the attention to or dis- 
regard of these relations. In the universal order, 
which consists in the relation of man to his Creator 
and his last end, the sanctions are final union with, 
or separation from God, and attainment or loss of 
man's last end. 

4. SANCTION AND MORAL LAW. No right- 
eous legislator can be indifferent as to whether his 
law be observed or violated; and will, therefore, 
sefeguard its observance by sanctions. A wise legis- 
lator will necessarily assign an adequate sanction. A 
just legislator will proportion the sanctions of his 
law to the merit of observing it or the demerit of 



Digests of Lectures. 



49 



violating it. But the Supreme Legislator is right- 
eous, wise and just. Moreover, the very concept of 
law founded in the nature and essential relations of 
things involves as a complement of its observance or 
violation a good or evil justly proportioned thereto. 
A law, the observance of which would ultimately re- 
sult in harm to the subject, and the violation of 
which would redound to his ultimate benefit would 
be irrational. 

5. THE SANCTIONS OF THIS LIFE. In order 
that the sanctions of this life be perfect: (a) The 
benefits must outweigh the disadvantages of observ- 
ing the law, and the goods that are found in violating 
the law must be less than the evils that likewise fol- 
low, and ( 5 ) the rewards for observing and the pains 
for violating must be proportioned respectively to ob- 
servance or violation. But these conditions are not 
universally verified in this life, as is evident from an 
examination of the natural sanctions of the indi- 
vidual or social order, and from the fact that the 
need of positive sanctions is recognized to supple- 
ment the efficacy of natural sanctions. Furthermore, 
it may happen that life itself should be sacrificed for 
the observance of the moral law. 

6. SANCTIONS IN A FUTUKE LIFE. Perfect 
sanction of the moral law can be had only in a state 
of existence which is the fulfillment and completion of 
this probationary existence. But this state consists in 
the realization or frustration of the ultimate perfec- 
tion of man's rational nature. Natural sanction, as 
has been said, is the agreeable or disagreeable state 
that follows naturally upon the right or wrong use 



50 



Digests op Lectures. 



of one's faculties ; care of one's health brings as its 
reward, for instance, the enjoyment of life, abuse of 
one's eyes brings finally as its punishment loss of 
vision. Now our moral life when rightly used tends 
increasingly to the perfection of our rational nature, 
and when abused to its increasing degradation. The 
limits of one is the realization, and of the other the 
frustration of our last end. 



Digests of Lectures. 



51 



X.— SUBJECTIVE RIGHT. 

Right subjectively considered is an inviolable moral 
faculty to do, to hold or exact ; and is derived from man's 
moral responsibility. the correlative of right is duty, 
i. e., the moral obligation either of not impeding the ex- 
ercise of another's right or of co-operating with it. 



1. THE NOTION involves: (a) moral power or 
liberty in the subject to do, to hold, or to exact; (b) 
and a moral restraint on others to interfere or con- 
straint to co-operate with the exercise of this liberty. 
Hence, the want of physical power does not invalidate 
right, nor the exercise of superior might destroy its 
moral inviolability. 

2. THE OKIGIN. To have a right it is necessary 
to have, (a) appetencies which indicate to us the 
proximate end of our faculties and the ultimate end 
of our nature; (5) the power of directing our appe- 
tencies, as we judge best, to the attaining of our 
good i. e., not license to do as we please, but liberty 
to choose as we please what is for our good; (c) the 
moral obligation of directing appetitive tendency 
to the end and the good ; a creature morally free to 
abuse or use his function, could not have a moral 
power that others are bound to respect. Every 
right, therefore, is in its last analysis the morally 
inviolable liberty of doing, holding or exacting some- 
thing which is mediately or immediately for the ra- 
tional well-being of the subject; hence, it is derived 



52 



Digests of Lectures. 



from man's moral responsibility to use appetencies 
implanted in his nature, in so far as their use is di- 
rectly or indirectly under his control, for the purpose 
of realizing his proximate ends and the ultimate end 
of his creation. An infant has rights in the same 
sense that it has intellect and free-will. 

Hence right is not derived: (a) from the mere pos- 
session of superior physical power — Hobbes; (6) 
from personal liberty considered in itself — Xeo-Kant- 
ianism; (c) from primary sensuous appetencies 
through evolution; and is not resolvable into two 
elements one positive, by which man recognizes his 
claim to the unimpeded satisfaction of his appe- 
tences, the other negative by which he is conscious of 
limitations imposed on him by the like claims of 
others — Spencer. 

Hence, prior to every right is duty, general or 
special ; and prior to every duty is God's right to the 
ultimate purpose of creation. 

3. CORRELATIVES OF RIGHT, (a) Subject- 
party, an existing person, whether physical or moral ; 
(6) ground, the law from which the right is derived; 

(c) title, the fact by which the right is actuated; 

(d) matter, what one may by right do, hold or exact ; 

(e) object-party, the person, present or future, on 
whom the duty of respecting the right devolves. 

Duty, is the moral obligation of doing, or omitting 
an action in favor of another. To every right in one 
there is at least a negative duty in another of not 
hindering the exercise of the right. The positive 
duty of co-operating is merely Ethical, when the 
obligation arises from a virtue other than justice; it 



Digests op Lectures. 



53 



is juridical when the obligation arises from 
justice. Every duty carries with it the right 
of freedom in the exercise of it. To every 
juridical duty of one person, there responds 
a perfect right in another person, and the latter is 
the immediate ground of the former. Every right is 
limited by the duty, general or special, from which it 
springs, and in case of apparent conflict of one right 
with another, the prevailing right is that which is 
founded in a higher duty. 

4. PERFECT RIGHT. A perfect right includes 
as a property of it, the right to the use of co-action 
in its defence or vindication. It is inviolable not 
only in the sense that it puts a bond on the will of 
another, but also in the sense that it gives the right 
to the use of force in order to compel physical inviola- 
bility. Co-active rights spring either from com- 
mutative justice or from social justice. The form- 
er differs from the latter, first in respect of matter ; 
in that the matter of the former regards the good of 
the individual, of the latter the good of the com- 
munity. They differ secondly in respect of repara- 
tion. The violation of commutative justice demands 
reparation of the injury inflicted; the violation of 
social justice cannot be repaired, since nothing can 
be done but what would have been obligatory, if 
there had been no violation. The penalty imposed 
for violating social justice belongs to distributive 
justice. The obligation of undergoing it, does not 
exist antecedently to the sentences of the judge. 

5. DIVISION OF RIGHTS. In respect of law 
from which they are derived: natural and positive. 



54 



Digests of Lectures. 



In respect of titles connatural, if possessed by the 
very fact of existence ; acquired, if possessed because 
of a fact supervening on existence. In respect of 
correlative duty in the subject of right: Inalien- 
able, if they cannot be ceded or renounced, because 
they are a necessary means of fulfilling an uncondi- 
tional duty; alienable, if they can be ceded or re- 
nounced without contempt of duty. 

6. EXERCISE OF EIGHT. The exercise of even 
an inalienable right may be delegated; not so the 
right itself. The exercise may in certain circum- 
stances be restrained by law, though the right re- 
tains it vigor. 

The right to the use of co-action in matters of com- 
mutative justice belongs primarily to the subject of 
the perfect right, secondarily and vicariously to 
the person (moral or physical) who has authority in 
the community of which the subject of the perfect 
right is a member. But the actual exercise of the 
coactive right belongs primarily to the head of the 
community, and secondarily, when the community 
fails to protect, and invasion of right is imminent, to 
the subject of the coactive right. The right to use 
coaction in matters of social justice belongs exclu- 
sively to the community, and its actual exercise to 
the representative of the community. 

REFERENCES: Rickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, 
Vol. II, questions LVII, LVIII, LXI, LXII. 
Cronin's Science op Ethics, Ch. XX. Rickaby's 
Moral Philosophy (Stonyhurst Series), part II, 
Ch. 5 Sect. 1 and 2. Ming's Data of Modern Ethics 
Examined, Ch. XIV. 



Digests of Lectures. 55 



XI.— CHARACTER. 

Character is an integration of habits of conduct su- 
perimposed on temperament. It is morally perfect when 
it results from the combined and harmonized virtues 
which determine our ethical and judicial duties to God, 
and our neighbor, and in respect of self. 



1. THE NOTION. Etymologically character means 
a significant mark stamped or cut on a hard material. 
Thence it was applied to a combination of qualities 
distinguishing one individual or group of individuals 
from others. The notion, therefore, varies with the 
science that employs it. Ethically it means the sum 
of moral traits or qualities which distinguish a per- 
son or class of persons from others, and by reason of 
which they receive a special moral designation. 

The qualities which individuate personality coal- 
esce in two synthesis : temperament due to nature 
and character due to nurture. 

2. TEMPERAMENT is the fusion of the various 
dispositions of our composite nature [into a re- 
sultant disposition of the whole man. Disposition is 
a native bent towards action of a certain kind, and 
capacity for a certain form or development. In a 
secondary sense it is a tendency that has been awak- 
ened by previous workings of bent, without, however, 
giving formed capacity ; so understood it is the initial 
factor of habit in formation. 

Habit is a quality superinduced in a faculty by re- 
peated performance of its functions, giving an im- 



56 



Digests of Lectures. 



pulse to and an ease in the exercise of these func- 
tions. Dispositions are congenital and plastic, i. e., 
receptive of form through use, and liable to degener- 
acy from disuse; habits are acquired and stable, i. e., 
once fixed can be thrown off only by the continued 
exercise of contrary acts. Habits of our rational 
nature are of two kinds : habits of thought, i. e., of 
intellect, and habits of conduct, i. e., of will. The 
latter may be either good or bad. We are concerned 
with habits of good conduct. Habits of thought in- 
vigorate intellectual dispositions and determine 
them in a particular direction, and are the products 
of disposition and training. Habits of conduct con- 
fer impulse and ease in the active determination of 
the will to appropriate ends, and are the product of 
will freely exercise on disposition, thought, emo- 
tion and action. 

3. CHARACTER. What dispositions are to tem- 
perament, that habits of conduct are to character. 
As the mental constitution due to the fusion of the 
former is temperament, so the blending of the latter 
into an unitary principle is character. Character, 
therefore, is an integration of habits of conduct su- 
perimposed on temperament. 

4. DUTIES. The term duty is used in two senses : 
(1) In a comprehensive sense to signify moral obli- 
gation of any kind, and in this sense it is the immedi- 
ate effect of objective right; (2) in a restricted 
sense to signify the moral obligation of doing some- 
thing in favor of another, and in this sense it is the 
immediate effect of a subjective right. All duty 
in its last analysis is the duty of obeying the supreme 



Digests op Lectures. 



57 



legislator. But duties regard different object-parties. 
The object-party of all duties is a person, namely, an 
intelligent being. We have duties concerning in- 
animate or animate beings ; and, as they rise in the 
grade of being towards us our duties concerning 
them, become more intensive, but we have no duties 
to them. Now, intellectual beings are in two cate- 
gories, created and increated being; and created be- 
ings are either self or others. The object-parties of 
duties, therefore, are God, self and our neighbor. 
Duties are natural or positive ; are affirmative or 
negative ; are merely ethical, or juridical also. The 
former in the last division is based on charity and 
the allied virtues, and the latter on justice. 

5. JUSTICE. The notion of justice is founded in 
the objective order of rights and duties. Parallel 
between physical order preserved by the balance of 
physical forces, and the moral order preserved by the 
"ad justment" of moral powers. As the equilibrium 
of the forces of nature is essential to the physical 
stability of the universe, so the equilibrium of the 
juridical order through proximate or final "ad-just- 
ment" is essential to justice. The equilibrium of 
rights that justice aims to preserve or restore entails 
an equality between men that is real and personal ; 
but not quantitative. As in the physical order equili- 
brium is preserved not by each body having mathe- 
matically equal powers, but by each having its own ; 
so in the juridical order, equilibrium is preserved not 
by all persons having the same rights, but by each 
having its own inviolate. Real equality in justice 
does not require that each should possess the same 



58 



Digests of Lectures. 



goods, but that they should be secure in the posses- 
sion or use of those to which they have a right. Per- 
sonal equality does not consist in the possession of 
equal mental or bodily qualities, but in a juridical in- 
dependence with regard to right conferred by nature. 

6. VIRTUES are habits of conduct prompting to 
the performance of duties. In relation to God vir- 
tues determine the attitude of intellect and will, 
which man should hold to Him both inwardly and 
outwardly. The virtues which fundamentally secure 
this are those by which he is prompted to seek knowl- 
edge of God and give Him intellectual submission, to 
love him above all things, and to desire final union 
with Him, i. e., Wisdom, Faith, Charity, Hope; and 
to give the worship and honor due Him, because of 
His infinite excellence, absolute dominion and su- 
preme good, i. e., Religion. In relation to self vir- 
tues give a readiness and ease in the right use of 
practical reason, i. e., Prudence; moderate the pas- 
sions that allure to sensuous delights, i. e., Temper- 
ance ; control the passions that arouse fear or impel 
to rashness in the presence of impending loss or 
threatening danger, i. e., Fortitude. In relation to 
the neighbor, individually or collectively, the virtues 
which regulate conduct are Benevolence and Justice. 
These virtues and those that are intrinsicallly allied 
to them, combined and harmonized produce a char- 
acter conformed to rational nature in all its essential 
relations, and is, therefore, perfect. 

REFERENCES: A treatment of the virtues is 
given in Rickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. I, p. 311 ; 
Vol. II, p. 381; Cronin's Ethics, Vol. I, Ch. XXIII, 



Digests of Lectures. 59 



XII.— DUTIES TO GOD. 

By the mobal law man is obliged to eendeb to God both 
pbivately and publicly, inteeior and exterior worship \ 
.and to believe in a dlvine revelation when it is made 
known to him. 



1. RELIGION. With the babelizing of language 
describing our moral and religious experience, the 
term religion has taken on a subjective and emotional 
meaning in modern philosophy. In this sense it can 
be defined as a feeling of self-abasement in the pres- 
ence of an idealized object apprehended to be forever 
above us, and a simultaneous feeling of personal 
exaltation and participation in the perfection of the 
ideal. In the union of these contradictory forms of 
emotion the essence of religion consists, independent- 
ly of its object. Historically religion means the 
conscious apprehension through intellect of a bond 
between beings possessing a spiritual nature, and a 
Supreme Being of transcendent excellence on whom 
they know or believe they depend. Following on this 
intellectual apprehension an emotional consciousness 
ensues. Religion, therefore, is a moral bond super- 
vening on the physical bond of dependence in exist- 
ence. A moral bond presupposes certain truths to 
which intellectual assent is given, entails certain 
duties arising from these truths. Theoretic religion 
is the sum of truths defining our relations to the Su- 
preme Being; practical religion the sum of duties 



60 



Digests of Lectures. 



inferred from these relations and prescribed by the 
moral law. Considered, therefore, in itself or ob- 
jectively it is a complex of these beliefs and duties ; 
considered in him who practices it or the subject of 
religion, it is a virtue, the seat of which is the will, 
and which inclines us to render to the Supreme Be- 
ing, because of His excellence, the worship that is 
due Him. It is, therefore, a virtue allied to justice. 

2. THE KELATIONS OF MAN TO GOD. These 
may be reduced to two ; to Him we should cling as to 
the first cause, and toward Him we should tend as to 
our last end. The duties of intellect are, therefore, 
to acknowledge; (a) His infinite excellence, (6) that 
He is the origin and Lord of all things, (c) that He is 
the Last End of all things. The duties of will are: 
(a) to show Him special reverence because of His 
infinite excellence, (&) special service because of His 
supreme lordship, (c) special love because He is the 
Last End. These duties of religion are expressed by 
the word divine worship or latria. 

3. DIVINE WOESHIP. Worship— or worthship 
— admits of various degrees, according to the worth 
or excellence of him to whom it is given. The solemn 
act of worship distinctive of religion is called ador- 
ation, (ad-oro; os, oris) and is payable only to the 
Deity because of infinite worth, and absolute lord- 
ship. By it we acknowledge the dependence of our 
intellect on his infinite intellect, of our will on his 
infinite will, of our nature and its faculty on his in- 
finite nature. This is done either interiorly by men- 
tal acts, or exteriorly by bodily acts. That wor- 
ship is due to God is clear from the truths demon- 



Digests of Lectures. 



61 



strated in Natural Theology : that God is the Creator 
of all, the absolute Lord, Supreme Ruler, a Being of 
infinite excellence, and the last end of man ; and that 
from these relations follow moral relations by which 
is acknowledged man's manifold dependence. 

4. EXTERIOR WORSHIP. 1. Man being a com- 
posite of body and spirit is so constituted that (a) 
he naturally gives exterior expression to interior 
affections ; ( b ) his interior affection is strengthened 
by exterior expression and decays in default of it. 
2. Man owes to God a worship commemsurate with 
his dependence. But man is not spirit merely, but a 
spirit in substantial union with a body and using the 
created goods of time. 

5. REVELATION. Revelation, which is the un- 
veiling of truths hitherto hidden, is either natural, 
when the unveiling is done by human reason, or di- 
vine, when done through the formal communication 
of thought by God. Divine revelation is not impossi- 
ble (a) on the part of God, if man can communicate 
thought, his Creator can; (6) on the part of man, if 
man can receive a revelation from his fellow-man 
auricularly, he can receive one from God through in- 
tellectual illumination; (c) on the part of the truth 
revealed, for these are truths the existence of which 
could not be known by unaided reason, and which 
when revealed to an intelligence of finite compass 
may be relatively unintelligible; (c) on the part of 
its purpose, for obedience of intellect is as essential 
in a creature, as other obedience. 

6. PROOF. The moral law obliges us to believe 
one, (a) who can neither deceive nor be deceived, (5) 



(32 



Digests of Lectures. 



who speaks, in order to be believed, (c) who has 
the right of speaking and of requiring intellectual 
assent to what he says. But when God reveals any- 
thing to man, and the fact of such revelation is 
known, these three conditions are present. 

7. OBJECTIONS. It might be admitted that a 
divine revelation of some truths not essentially be- 
yond human ken would be advantageous in order 
that all men might easily and in due time and 

WITHOUT ADMIXTURE OP DOUBT OR ERROR know what is 

necessary for their moral life, i. e., God, immorality 
and freedom. But a knowledge of mysteries is use- 
less — to believe them is unworthy of a reasoning be- 
ing — such belief enslaves the intellect — and begets 
intolerance. These difficulties miss the point at issue 
or exaggerate the truth. 

REFERENCES: Rickaby's God and His Crea- 
tures, Bk. I, Ch. 3-8 ; Newman's Grammar of Assent, 
Ch. X; Gerard's The Wayfarer's Vision. 



Digests of Lectures. 63 



XIII.— DUTIES IN RESPECT OF 
SELF. 

The Moral Law obliges man to acquire the knowledge 
essential to his eternal welfare, and to the performance 
of the duties of life ; to govern his volitional activity 
by this knowledge, to have a rational care of health and 
life, to seek the external goods of life in so far as they 
are necessary and useful for fulfilling the duties of his 
state in life. 



1. LOVE OF SELF. Every one, by a primary im 
pulse of nature, wishes and does well to self. This 
impulse indicates a precept of the moral law, ration- 
ally confirmed by the fact that we are essentially 
servant of the Creator, and ought to use the faculties 
he gave, and the means at our disposal for procuring 
our well-being. Love of self is, therefore, a duty. 
Like every impulse indicative of the purpose of life 
it may be irregular. It must conform to the supreme 
purpose of creation and the essential relations of 
man. It becomes excessive or defective if it goes be- 
yond, or falls below the measure and mode presented 
by reason. Its excess is Egotism, or the placing of 
man's supreme good in the happiness of self ; its de- 
fect is Altruism, or the making the happiness of 
others the supreme norm of conduct — Comte. A 
sane reconciliation of self-love and benevolence is had 
in the precept of Christ: "Thou shalt love thy neigh- 
bor as thyself." 



04 



Digests of Lectures. 



The duties of man in respect of self-regard: (a) 
the soul, i. e., the due development of intellect and 
will; (&) the body, i. e., rational care of life and 
health ; (c) the outer goods of life, i. e., such personal 
goods as wealth and social goods as good name and 
honor. 

2. SOUL. The essential duties of man with re- 
gard to his intellect is to perfect it by acquiring the 
knowledge necessary for attaining the ultimate pur- 
pose of life, for filling the obligations of his social 
nature in the family and in civil society, and for per- 
forming the offices belonging to his occupations in 
life; (&) to perfect his will by self-mastery and self- 
reverence, and by acquiring the virtues that befit it. 

Defects of intellect arise from: (a) unreason- 
able attachment to previously formed opinion, (b) 
disregard for the value of objective truth, (c) the ex- 
altation of imagination above reason. Defects of 
will arise from: (a) want of will power, (b) pre- 
dominance of passionate will over reason, (c) arbi- 
trariness in forming views. 

3. BODY. Life, health and bodily faculties are 
given by nature for instrumental purposes defined by 
the ends to which of their nature they are directed. 
Their use for other purposes is abuse. Their worth 
is subordinate to the higher purposes of the soul. 
We are not absolute masters to dispose of them 
wilfully, but stewards to use them in accord with 
reason. Mens sana in corpore sano does not empha- 
size corpus but mens. Hence (a) to imperil life or 
health from rashness, vanity, or inordinate love of 
pleasures is a violation of duty, (&) to sacrifice the 



Digests of Lectures. 



65 



higher good of the soul for the preservation of life or 
health is equally a violation of duty, (c) to indulge 
in mental or bodily satisfactions, or experiments 
which perturb reason or weaken will-power is also 
a violation of duty. 

4. OUTER GOODS of life are a good name, free- 
dom of action and wealth. These it is our duty to 
retain or procure in so far as they are necessary for 
fulfilling the obligations of our personal, social, pro- 
fessional or business life. They, too, are instru- 
mental good, and may be sought only within the 
bounds of reason ; in so far as they are useful to our 
state of life, the rational pursuit of them is lawful. 

Good name is either good repute or the esteem in 
which we are held by others, or honor, i. e., the mani- 
festation through outward signs of that esteem. Es- 
teem is general, viz., that which is due to us as 
persons, by reason of which we have a right to be 
treated in accord with the dignity of rational beings ; 
that which is due to us as moral beings by reason of 
which evil is not to be imputated to us unjustly ; that 
which is due to us as composite beings by reason of 
which disgraceful defects or conditions of mind or 
body are not to be attributed to us groundlessly. 
Esteem is special, when arising from personally 
special virtues of mind or heart, or from social or 
civic dignity. 

Freedom of Action is immunity from the coaction 
of force in the performance of our duties or the ex- 
ercise of our rights. 

Wealth is the possession of a sufficiency of ma- 
terial goods, i. e., of material goods required for 



66 



Digests of Lectures. 



satisfactorily fulfilling duties incumbent on us per- 
sonally, or because of our state in life. Wealth is 
distinguished from riches, which is a superabund- 
andce of such goods. There is no duty of becoming 
rich, but it is lawful to acquire riches, provided the 
moderation of reason, benevolence and justice are 
preserved. The rich have a duty of beneficence, the 
object and mode of which is left to their own deter- 
mination of using for the advance of industry and 
social prosperity, what is superfluous in their riches, 
i. e., what is above the demands of personal well-be- 
ing and their state of life. They may also be obliged 
by the virtue of munificence. All men have the duty 
of helping their neighbor individually who is in the 
extremity of need from their personal resources 
which are above their personal needs. 

REFERENCES : Rickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. 
I, pp. 93-100 ; pp. 381-389 ; pp. 267-275 ; pp. 375-383 ; 
pp. 278-280. 



Digests of Lectures. C>7 



XIV. — DUTIES REGARDING LIFE. 

The direct mutilation or killing of oneself of one's 
own motion is prohibited by the Moral Law. 



1. SUICIDE. The killing of self may be direct 
and indirect. It is direct when the agent's action is 
of its nature destructive of life, and when the agent 
intends such destruction as the result of his action. 
What is true of action destructive of life is true also 
of omission of actions preservative of life. We assert 
the duty not only of not destroying, but also of pre- 
serving life. It is indirect when the agent's action 
has two effects, one of which is destructive of life, 
and the other productive of a good effect. The in- 
direct killing of self is not suicide, when (a) the ac- 
tion from which the two effects issue is in itself good 
or indifferent; (5) the good effect is not obtained 
through the intermediation of the bad effect, (c) the 
agent intends only the good effect, (d) the motives 
for obtaining the good effect are comparatively of 
equal gravity. Neither is it suicide to omit actions 
for the preservation of life, when the enumerated 
conditions obtain. 

The killing of self is of one's own motion, when the 
volitional action is within one's power both physi- 
cally and morally. Hence it is suicide to kill one's 
self at the command of an authority whose juris- 
diction does not extend to proprietorship over human 
life. 



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Digests of Lectures. 



2. MALICE OF SUICIDE. The question is 
whether suicide is intrinsically evil, and hence always 
wrong; or evil because of its consequences, and 
hence in given circumstances right. Many writers 
assign reasons for the malice of suicide which are ex- 
trinsic, not universally valid, or beg the question. 
Arguments from rational love of self as usually pre- 
sented beg the question ; arguments deduced from our 
duty to human society, to the state, to relatives and 
friends are not universally valid, and are extrinsic, 
i. e., derived from consequences of the suicide's act; 
arguments from God's supreme dominion over us do 
not prove since God's dominion over all things is 
supreme. A valid argument must prove that God's 
dominion over man's life is not only supreme, but 

EXCLUSIVE. 

3. PEOOF I. By suicide one exercises an act of 
ownership (a) over his personality as existing in his 
composite nature, (b) over the moral fruit of his 
personal existence, (c) over the providential ends of 
his Creator. 

But (a) God has exclusive dominion over man's 
personality as existing in his composite nature, for 
man is essentially not merely a creature, but 
a servant of God. (6) God has exclusive dominion 
over the moral fruits of man's personal existence, for 
he alone has the right to determine the measure of 
glory to given by man. (c) God has exclusive do- 
minion over the providential ends for which He 
created man, for He alone can forsee those ends and 
has a right to determine the length of life for their 
realization. 



Digests op Lectures. 



69 



II. Hence the rational love man owes himself pro- 
hibits self-destruction, since he cannot destroy his 
life withuot withdrawing himself from the field of 
moral and meritorious service to which he has been 
assigned by his Creator, and consequently unfitting 
himself for his final perfection. Hence, the instinct 
of self-preservation is indicative of a fundamental 
and prohibitive precept of morality. 

III. Hence, as a social being, bound to other men 
by the "solidarity" of social nature, he cannot with- 
draw from life, without breaking the social bonds of 
charity and justice by which he has to further the 
providential ends of his Creator, with regard to self 
and others. 

IV. DIFFICULTIES. From Seneca. 1. A gift 
may be returned to the donor when found to be in- 
tolerable. Life is a gift. 

2. When a man becomes useless, burdensome or 
harmful to others, he may be compared to a diseased 
member of the body, which may be lawfully cut off 
to save the whole body. 3. It cannot be wrong for a 
son to return to his father from a distant country. 
God is our father, we are his sons, separated afar 
from him. 

4. At least it is right to kill one's self in order to 
escape from a life of turpitude, which one cannot 
avoid. From Hume. — If it is wrong to kill one's self, 
because one thereby invades the dominion of God, it 
is wrong from the same reason to fly from impending 
physical danger of life, since these dangers arise 
from necessary causes of which God is the author. 



TO 



Digests of Lectures. 



5. INJURIES TO HEALTH. The arguments al- 
ready given apply with due proportion to all actions 
or omissions by which bodily or mental integrity and 
health, are directly affected. Hence, to multilate 
one's body, to expose one's self rashly to danger of 
death or disease, to indulge in vices by which the 
faculties of soul or body are debilitated are inva- 
sions of God's rights, who gave body and soul to be 
used for the purposes, proximate or ultimate, of 
creation. Questions regarding indirect killing of 
self or self-injury are settled on the principles deter- 
mining the moral lawfulness of an action having a 
good and bad effect. 

REFERENCES: Rickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, 
Vol. II, question LXIV, Art. 5, and question LXV, 
Art. 1. 



Digests op Lectures. 71 



XV. — DUTIES REGARDING 
VERACITY. 

The deliberate utterance of what one thinks to be 
false is prohibited by the moral law j but to conceal the 
truth in certain cases may not only be lawful but obli- 
GATORY. 



1. VEEACITY. Speech may be false, either be- 
cause it is out of accord with the fact, or because it 
is out of accord with the mind's judgment of the 
fact. Both are deviation from the truth; the first 
may be unintentional, the second is deliberate and in- 
tentional. We are concerned with the deliberate 
utterance of what the speaker thinks to be false, 
whether as a matter of fact it be so or not. A lie has 
been variously defined: 1. It is usually defined as 
the utterance of what one thinks to be false with 
the intention of deceiving. But (a) one can de- 
ceive by telling the truth, and tell the truth with the 
intention of deceiving ; ( b ) one can deliberately utter 
what one thinks to be false, without hope or inten- 
tion of deceiving, e. g., to avoid self conviction. In 
this notion of a lie, therefore, there are two distinct 
and separable, though generally concomitant ele- 
ments, each having a malice of its own. 2. It is 
often defined as the deliberate utterance of an un- 
truth to one who has a right to know the truth. But 
(a) in this definition also there are two distinct and 
separable elements; (6) the term "right" is used in 



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Digests of Lectures. 



a vague and scarcely definable sense, (c) the malice 
of a lie becomes relative. 3. It is defined as in the 
proposition. The definition is justified by the com- 
mon conception of men, who regard lying and truth- 
fulness as contraries. But one is truthful when one's 
utterance is in accord with one's mental judgment. 
Accessory phases of lying may modify its intrinsic 
malice. Besides its own, it may have the added 
malice of injustice or malevolence. 

2. THE INTKINSIC MALICE OF LYING. A lie 
is primarily a degradation of the intellectual nature 
of the speaker, since {a) it puts discord between 
the judgment of his mind and its natural comple- 
ment, speech; (6) between the intellect whose good 
is truth and the will intending falsity in speech; (c) 
in general between the inner conviction and the con- 
natural outer expression of it. Secondarily, its 
natural tendency is to weaken the social bonds of 
mutual trust and intercourse, and consequently it is 
a deformity of man's social nature. 

3. CONCEALING THE TKUTH. A truth which 
one is under obligation not to reveal, or which one 
has a right to conceal is a secret. A natural secret 
is one which is such from the nature of the thing 
known : one's own or one's neighbor's private affairs, 
which cannot be revealed without giving reasonable 
offense or doing an injury. A secret of promise is 
one which, on discovering the fact by one's own law- 
ful observation, one promises not to reveal, whether 
such fact be a natural secret or not. A secret of 
trust is knowledge received on the express or tacit 
agreement that having been communicated for a seri- 



Digests of Lectures. 



73 



ous purpose it be held in trust, e. g., knowl- 
edge communicated to a lawyer, physician, con- 
fidential agent, or even in circumstances to a 
friend. A sacramental secret, the secret re- 
ceived by a priest in confession. This secret is 
absolutely priviliged under all circumstances, and 
against all inquirers since it is a secret communi- 
cated to a priest, not as a fellow-man, but precisely 
as a minister of God. A secret of trust is privi- 
leged over the first two, and against all inquirers, ex- 
cept when the good of the community is gravely im- 
perilled. The other two secrets are not privileged 
against an authority empowered to inquire in the 
department in which the secret lies. The precept 
of veracity is not only negative, forbidding lies, but 
affirmative, commanding speech when competent 
authority asks. 

4. KEEPING SECRETS. The social bonds of 
mutual trust intercourse and security depend as 
much on the keeping of lawful secrets, as it does on 
veracity. One who attempts to discover unlawfully 
another's secrets is an unjust agressor. To keep a 
secret it is never allowed to lie. It may be kept by 
reticence, or by deceiving one against whom the 
secret is privileged, i. e., by inducing him into error. 
Deception as such is a wrong done to another's intel- 
lect and never lawful except in blameless and legiti- 
mate self-defense against an unjust agressor. 

5. SPEECH AND LANGUAGE. Speech is natu- 
ral, language is conventional. Speech takes its 
meaning not only from the grammatical signification 
of the words used, but also from the circumstances 



74 



Digests of Lectures. 



of time and place in which, and the person to whom 
they are uttered. Speech may be verbally false, yet 
by the usage of society either true or a form of reti- 
cence. The use of speech verbally false, but having 
an established meaning by convention is lawful when 
required for the lawful retention of a secret. 

REFERENCES -.—Slater's Manual of Moral The- 
ology, Vol. I., Bk., VI, part VIII, Ch. 4 and 5, 
pp. 464-473. Rickaby's Political and Moral Essays, 
IV; for discussion of the subject without analysis 
of the thing discussed see Paulsen's System of Ethics 
Bk. Ill, Ch. XI. Sedgwick's Method of Ethics, Bk. 
Ill, Ch. VII. Rickaby's Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. II, 
Quest. 109-111. 



Digests op Lectures. 75 



XVI.— DUTIES TO OTHERS. 

The Moral Law obliges man to eespect the rights of 
others to moral and intellectual integrity, to health 
and life, to good name and property. the rights enumer- 
ated are co-active rights ', and may be protected from un- 
just aggression, provided the moderation of blameless de- 
fense is used, by the use of force suited to secure them 
and proportioned to the loss threatened. 



1. DUTIES IN GENERAL. Our duties to others 
are comprised under charity and justice. Charity 
or love of others is- based on the facts: (a) that 
all men have the same essential dignity of 
rational nature; (6) the same social nature 
(c) the same ultimate destiny. The obliga- 
tion varies with closeness under these heads. 
The rule: "Love thy neighbor as thyself" does not 
mean that the neighbor is to be loved with the same 
measure of love as self, but, that love of self should 
be the exemplar of love of others. But love of self 
should be (a) in respect of its end, rational; (6) of 
its form benevolent; (c) of its effect beneficent. 
Many duties of love involve, analogues of justice, as 
gratitude, veracity. Justice is based on the right 
of each to have and to hold what is his own in peace 
and security. The duties are enumerated in the 
proposition. 

2. MORAL INTEGRITY. The neighbor has the 
right: (a) that no unbecoming word or deed of ours 



7G 



Digests of Lectures. 



be to him an occasion of moral corruption; (6) that 
by no action of ours is he deprived of necessary or 
salutary means of preserving or promoting his moral 
integrity. The first violation is called scandal. 
Scandal may be given without being taken, or taken 
without being given. Scandal, when taken, though 
not given is: (a) Scandal of the little ones, i. e., a 
word or deed, which harmless in itself, is when 
tered or done in presence of the young an occasion 
to them of moral injury. Maxima reverentia de- 
betur pueris. (6) Pharisaical scandal, I. e., when 
through malice what is harmless is taken as an 
occasion of evil. Scandal, properly so called, i. e., 
when given and taken is: (a) indirect, when the of- 
fensive word is uttered or deed done primarily for 
one's own pleasure with disregard of its effect on 
others ; (6) direct or diabolical when the direct pur- 
pose is to lead others astray either as a means or 
end. Moral injury is done to the neighbor: (a) by 
depriving him of the means of leading his spiritual 
life — children, orphans, prisoners; (6) by failing to 
give him the example due him : parents, teachers, per- 
sons of exemplary prominence; (c) by putting one's 
employees in circumstances in which the employer's 
interests are furthered by frauds or dishonesty. 

3. INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY. Sufficiently 
treated already. Truth, leading into error. Infi- 
delity to promises. 

4. BODILY INTEGRITY, of life and health. The 
violations arise from unjust aggression, culpable 
negligence, greed of material goods. 



Digests of Lectures. 



77 



5. GOOD NAME, and Honor. Every one has a 
right to acquire by his legitimate industry a good 
repute among his fellownien, and having acquired it 
to retain it. This right is violated (a) by calumny, 
i. e., by falsely imputing to another moral defects, 
or physical defects of a dishonoring nature; (&) by 
detraction, i. e., by revealing the hidden defects, 
moral or physical, of another. Causes justifying 
such revealing are: (a) the common good, which is 
imperiled by keeping the secret. (&) Necessary and 
blameless self-defense. 

6. DEFENSE AND VINDICATION. Coactive 
rights may be defended if attacked, or vindicated if 
violated. But (a) recourse must be had to civil au- 
thority; (b) if this is not available, the means used 
must be suited to secure the rights and proportioned 
to the loss threatened; (c) they must be used only 
against unjust aggression; (d) though used in vindi- 
cation, they must not be used vindictively; (e) the 
means least harmful to the neighbor must be used. 

Hence (a) to preserve one's honor or fame, or to 
exact its restoration by inflicting death or grave 
bodily injury on one's detractor or calumniator is 
not lawful, because first, there is no proportion be- 
tween the two goods at stake, and secondly, the 
means is not suited for the purpose intended. Hence 
(5) a woman may defend her honor by the death of 
the unjust aggressor, but not by self-destruction, 
since her honor is appreciatively as valuable as life. 
Hence (c) a man may inflict death on an unjust ag- 
gressor of life, since the loss threatened is irreparable, 
and in the conflict of rights, the prevailing right is 



78 



Digests op Lectures. 



that of the innocent party. Hence (d) the mutilation 
of another with his consent is lawful when a neces- 
sary means of securing a higher good, but the mutila- 
tion of another without his consent is never lawful 
to a private indivdiual, and is lawful to civil authority 
only when it is punitive in character, i. e., inflicted 
for a crime committed, and proportioned to it. The 
state has no more right to mutilate in order to pre- 
vent prospective crime, than it has to put to death in 
order to prevent prospective murder. 

KEFEKENCES : Kickaby's Aquinas Ethicus Vol. 
I, pp. 365-373 ; 413-419 ; Vol. II, pp. 78-90 ; 39-51. 
Violations of property rights we shall see later. 



Digests of Lectures. 79 



XVII.— RIGHT TO MATERIAL 
THINGS. 

Every one has a connatural right to the material 
things by which life is sustained. the right of owner- 
ship, though conditioned on a contingent and universal 
fact, is when actuated by a legitimate title, based on 
Moral Law. In case of extreme need the connatural 
right prevails over the right of ownership. 



1. MATERIAL GOODS. Some material goods 
are of such a nature that they are not consumed by 
use, and that their supply is inexhaustible, as light, 
air. These are by nature positively common to all 
men in the sense that they neither are nor can be- 
come the property of either an individual or a com- 
munity. Others are limited in supply, or are con- 
sumed by use, or have no utility unless appropriated, 
as the contents of the earth and sea, fruits, animals. 
These are by nature negatively common, i. e., nature 
does not assign them to individuals or communities 
as property, which must be held by one party, 
whether individual or communal, to the exclusion of 
the other ; but leaves their appropriation to be deter- 
mined by the exigencies of life, the nature of the 
goods, and the dictates of reason. The utility of 
some demands their possession by the community, 
either as common property, a roadway ; or as things 
in common, a fountain to drink from; the utility of 
others demand their possession by an individual, as 
food, clothing. 



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Digests op Lectures. 



2. EIGHT TO MATERIAL GOODS. By the fact 
that one has come into existence one has a connatu- 
ral right to live, to the means of existence and self- 
development, and to the exercise of his activity there- 
for. This right is absolute, i. e., it does not depend 
on a fact supervening on existence, but it is as un- 
conditional as is the right to life itself. It is inde- 
feasible; it cannot be set aside or made void by 
others rights which are acquired. It is regulative 
of other rights to material goods, i. e., it indicates the 
ideal end of material goods, to which any form 
of acquired tenure must be conformed, and by which 
it is limited. 

Hence (a) economic conditions that frustrate this 
ideal end of material things, by congesting these 
goods in the hands of the few, by making it unreason- 
ably difficult for the many to obtain them is by the 
very fact against the moral law: (b) personal owner- 
ship is justifiable in so far as it safeguards for men 
generally the equable, effective and peaceful realiza- 
tion of the ideal end of material goods; (c) no ac- 
quired ownership is so absolute that it overrides the 
connatural rights of other men, or is superior to well- 
being of the community; (d) the end of individual 
ownership, though primarily personal is secondarily 
social. 

3. THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP. By owner- 
ship we understand the stable right of disposing of 
the substance, utility and fruits of a thing as one's 
own for any purpose not incompatible with a higher 
right. It includes proprietorship and usufruct, un- 
defined as to duration. The institution of personal 



Digests of Lectures. 



81 



property is based on the application of moral princi- 
ples to the facts of human nature as manifested in 
history. Its origin is historical and juridical. Neg- 
lect of either aspects lead to error — extreme individu- 
alism, or socialism. The juridical principles are: (a) 
every man, as a person, has a connatural right to 
means of providing for himself and those depending 
on him; (&) as a social being he has the duty of so 
exercising this right as to respect the equipollent 
rights of others. The historical facts are that: (a) 
man is by the laws of psychology more solicitous of 
what concerns himself, than of what concerns others ; 
( b ) human affiairs are conducted more orderly when 
each has charge of what concerns himself; (c) social 
peace is better preserved and social prosperity better 
promoted when each can normally satisfy his instinct 
of possession. This fact is universal, in the sense 
that it is and has been true of man generally; it is 
contingent in the sense that it does not impose a 
necessity on all men. Now, an institution that is nec- 
essary in order that men, as they historically are, may 
exercise effectively, orderly and peacefully their con- 
natural rights and social duties is based on the moral 
law. But stable and exclusive proprietary rights over 
some of the material goods of life is necessary for this 
purpose. The personal right of providing for his pres- 
ent and future sustenance, protection and develop- 
ment, his social duties towards the family and toward 
his fellow-men are better secured by the right of own- 
ership. Civilization has advanced with the evolution 
of the institution of property. The abuses that 
exist are diseases of civilization, not due to the right 
of ownership itself, but to the contempt of connatu- 



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Digests of Lectures. 



ral rights, juridical principles and historical facts by 
the morally depraved or undeveloped. 

4. THE TITLES, by which the right to property is 
actuated, are original and derivative. Two original 
titles are natural and therefore juridical by the moral 
law: occupancy and labor. Occupancy is the effec- 
tive taking of a thing that is nobody's (res nullius, 
or res derelicta) with the intention of holding it as 
one's own. The moral validity of this title was first 
denied by Ferguson, and subsequently by Legalists 
who derive the right of ownership from civil author- 
ity, and by Socialists who say that it is the source 
of all economic evils. Its moral validity is proved: 
(a) because it is an invasion of nobody's right; (6) 
because it is presupposed to all original ownership, 
and the rejection of it would destroy any ownership 
whatsoever even of a temporary character. Labor 
is a productive activity by which a material thing is 
specifically changed for a useful purpose, or by which 
ideas are combined for the communication of ordered 
thought, or the devising of practical methods. Labor 
is manual or mental. The title of labor is univer- 
sally conceded to be a valid title, except by some ex 
treme Socialists in the case of mental labor. Deri- 
vatives titles are two : exchange and hereditary suc- 
cession. No difficulty exists regarding the moral 
validity of exchange. The civil law may for the 
protection of rights put conditions for its legitimate 
exercise. Hereditary succession is the acquiring 
by one's heirs of the goods and rights one was pos- 
sessed of at death. Its moral validity is denied by 
Legalists, its legitimacy by Socialists. It can be 



Digests of Lectures. 



83 



proved so far at least as immediate linear heirs are 
concerned. For the right of the parent to acquire 
and hold property has not merely a personal but a 
family purpose. But these ends cannot be securely 
guaranteed without the right of hereditary succession. 
The denial of this right involves social evils. The 
alternatives would be, that the goods of the defunct 
would become res nullius, subject to first occupancy, 
or would be escheated to the state. The evils arising 
from these would be manifold. 



REFERENCES : Rickaby's Aquinis Ethicus, Vol. 
II, pp. 53-55; and 57; p. 5; Vol. I, p. 284, section 3. 



84 Digests of Lectures. 



XVIII. — SOCIALISM. 

Socialism as an economic theory, or collectivism, is in 
view of the above mentioned fact adverse to the material 
prosperity of the race ; as a philosophic theory it en- 
tails a crude materialistic interpretation of history ; as 
a political theory it leads to democratic absolutism. 



1. COLLECTIVISM is socialism looked at econo- 
mically. It holds that economic justice can be se- 
cured only by the institution of a social system in 
which (a) all productive goods, i. e., the resources, 
materials and instruments of production will be 
owned by the community, (6) all labor and service 
will be collectively organized, (c) products personal- 
ly needed will be distributed according to the pro- 
ductive value of the individual's labor. It repudi- 
ates reform of the existing system of holding prop- 
erty, and advocates revolution which will wholly 
abolish it. 

2. MARXIAN BASIS. All wealth is the pro- 
duct of labor; the value (i. e., in exchange) is fixed 
by the amount of labor employed in its production. 
Labor is measured by the length "of, time required 
to produce an article under normal conditions of 
production, and with the average degree of skill and 
intensity prevalent at the time." We hold (a) that 
wealth is the product of nature, intelligence and 
labor; (5) that its value is determined by the element 
common to all commodities, i. e., capacity to satisfy 



Digests of Lectures. 



85 



human wants, i. e., desire of them adpected by dif- 
ficulty of getting them; (c) that this value is not 
measured in a mechanical way, i. e., quantitatively, 
but appreciated relatively. The social appreciation, 
when not interferred with by industrial conspiracies, 
is expressed by the market-price. The determinants 
of the market-price are: (a) the qualitative excellence 
of the raw material; (6) the qualitative form given 
to it by the workmen; (c) the capacity of the 
finished product to satisfy human wants, (d) the 
greater or less abundance of the things wanted, (e) 
the cost of production. The error of Marx is two- 
fold: 1. A defect, he does not credit labor with its 
full causation. The workman not only consumes so 
many hours of labor-time : he creates in accord with 
his ability, and industry, utilities. 2. An excess, he 
minimizes the productiveness of intelligent direction, 
supervision and invention; and, therefore, cheats 
some, and overpays others in order to reduce all to 
economic equality. 

3. PROOF. The material prosperity of a people, 
in view of the historical facts mentioned in the last 
lecture, depends on four principles: (a) that men 
should have a personal motive for laboring; (6) that 
men should have personal freedom in their modes of 
labor; (c) that men should be personally responsible 
for the outcome of their activities; (d) that men 
should compete with the moderation of justice. Now 
collectivism (a) would paralyse the personal impulse 
to acquire wealth for the sake of personal culture, 
family improvement, or social advance through liter- 
ary or inventive talent; (b) all persons being ser- 



80 



Digests op Lectures. 



vants of the state, it would crush freedom, independ- 
ence, personal dignity, and initiative, (c) it would 
extinguish personal responsibility by doing away 
with providence, personal, domestic or civic; (d) it 
would close opportunity for healthy emulation. 

4. SYNDICALISM is a form of revolution advo- 
cated by the I. W. W. Its aim is not community 
ownership, but sectional ownership., i. e., the workers 
of each trade or business own their respective instru- 
ments and materials of production, fix wages and 
prices. It is a revolt against Socialism, has not been 
elaborated into an intellectual system, and in prac- 
tice would set the various trades unions at war with 
one another and with the community. 

5. SINGLE TAX SOCIALISM is a theory which 
holds (a) that the site values of land is a creation 
of the community, (6) that this site value should be 
taxed and other taxes abolished, (c) that this system 
would abolish "privilege/ 7 But (a) "site value of 
land" is not more a social product than are busi- 
ness values, (h) it is frequently due to industrial 
causes, (c) a single tax would sin against distri- 
butive justice, by ignoring the incidence of fair taxa- 
tion, (d) it would lead to proprietorship becoming 
a perpetual lease, and hence to Land Naturalization, 
(e) it could not be gradually introduced without 
gradual denial of equitable compensation to existing 
owners. 

G. SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM. Every social 
movement is based on some theory regarding the 
forces that gave being to social institutions, their 



Digests op Lectures. 



87 



proximate purposes, and the ultimate goal of the 
human race. Philosophic socialism holds the theory 
of economic determinism, i. e., all human progress 
arises from and is determined solely by economic 
motive forces. It holds that the supreme purpose to 
which man ought to subordinate every other purpose 
and institution is material well-being and comfort. 
It holds that the ultimate goal of human life is to 
attain this universally; that morality, either per- 
sonal, domestic or civil, is meaningless out of relation 
to this. 

This philosophy is materialistic, since it lowers 
man to the level of a high-grade animal, for whom 
there is no after life, and whose only purpose in this 
life is to survive in the struggle for life. It is crude, 
since it contradicts what we know of human nature; 
material well-being does not bring happiness, nor does 
it make virtuous. It is a falsehood, since it pro- 
mises what it cannot fulfil, and what, so far as we 
know human nature, cannot be attained in this 
world. 

7. POLITICAL SOCIALISM. The institution 
of socialism involves some form of the state. It 
would be some form of representative democracy in 
which every office was elective, and subject to the 
immediate control of the people. On the other hand 
it would necessitate the thorough organization of 
government throughout the whole range of produc- 
tion and social service. The government would have 
monopolistic powers over all the materials and in- 
struments of production, supreme control of all the 
supplies of life, authority as far as its power and 



88 



Digests of Lectures. 



control extended over every citizen. It would be a 
system of democratic absolutism. The majority 
would have tyrannical power over the minority with 
regard to the means of subsistence, intellectual life, 
the worship of God, and the constitution of the 
family. Within the majority a ruling power would 
arise — whether an individual or a body of individuals 
— who would rule the state. Anarchy would be the 
alternative. Over this power the checks that can be 
used today through the independence of the indi- 
vidual from the state in numberless relations would 
be abolished. In effect we should all become serfs 
of an u inner circle," which could work unseen to keep 
us in intellectual, civil and political subservience. 
Such a government would be omnipotent — the reali- 
zation of Hegel's State. 

REFERENCES: Schaeffle's The Quintessence of 
Socialism, and The Impossibility of Democratic 
Socialism. Ely's Socialism and the Labor Move- 
ment in America. Ming's Morality of Socialism and 
Eeligion of Socialism. The Common Cause, a maga- 
zine, exposes the movement and theories of the So- 
cialism of the present day. De Tunzelman's The 
Superstition called Socialism. Goldstein's Socialism. 



Digests of Lectures. 89 



XIX.— MONOPOLY. 

Monopoly exists by favor or tolerance of the civic 
community, and is lawful only when it subserves the 

COMMON WELFARE. It MAY BECOME A SOCIAL EVIL, ECONOM- 
ICALLY, POLITICALLY AND ETHICALLY. 



1. MONOPLY. (monos, polein) is such a con- 
trol of commodities, business or powers of nature as 
enables the person or persons exercising it to fix 
prices. Whatever is marketable, as material goods, 
labor, natural resources, or money may be the sub- 
ject matter of monoply. The essence of monopoly 
does not consist in exclusive ownership, but in ex- 
clusive or dominating power to regulate the market 
in regard to things which are not of their nature the 
exclusive possession of an individual or body of in- 
dividuals, and which therefore are subject to com- 
petition. 

2. KINDS. Monopolies are either social, i. e., 
owing their existence to social causes, or natural, 
i. e., owing their existence to the nature or condition 
of the marketable thing. 

3. SOCIAL monoplies exist: (a) because they are 
instituted by civil authority, e. g., the postal service; 
(&) because though established by private individuals 
they owe their existence either directly, as patent 
rights, or indirectly, as monopolies springing from 
an unnecessary protective tariff, to laws enacted 
by civil authority; (c) because they owe their exist- 



90 



Digests of Lectures. 



ence to favors or concessions granted by powerful 
associations of capital, such as railroads or banks. 
Now, in all three cases they exist either because the 
civil authority legalized them, or because it favors 
them by legal concessions, or by legal toleration. 

4. NATURAL monopolies owe their origin to the 
fact, (a) that the commodity is limited in quantity 
or confined in place, e. g., anthracite coal, platinum ; 
(6) that the business is of such a sort that it cannot 
be effectively administered, unless controlled by one 
person, private or corporate, e. g., a telephone sys- 
tem; (c) that the business is of such a sort that it 
cannot be established and conducted except by a 
combination of capital, e. g., a railroad system; (d) 
that its production is by processes known only to one 
or a few. Now these monopolies exist either because 
the civil community considers it for the common good 
that they should so exist, or because it neglects to 
appropriate them, when it is contrary to the public 
good that they should be in private hands. 

5. WHEN LAWFUL. Monopolies are lawful 
when they subserve the common welfare: (a) when 
legalized, they protect the rights of individuals and 
secure them the fruits of their industry, e. g., copy- 
rights; (6) when established in order to restrain the 
production and sale of an article, the immoderate 
use of which is prevalent, and seriously harmful to 
the community, e. g., the opium monopoly in Japan ; 
(c) when established in order to encourage an in- 
dustry or commerce needed for the well-being or 
protection of the community, and cannot be brought 
into existence except by monopoly; (d) when neces- 



Digests op Lectures. 



91 



sary to produce fiscal revenue. These cases are to 
be taken strictly, because when once established for 
the reasons given they are liable to abuse. 

6. WHEN UNLAWFUL. Monopolies may become 
social evils economically, politically, or ethically. 
Monopoly is an evil economically, (a) when it 
raises prices beyond and lowers wages below what 
they would be under competition; (b) when it does 
not equitably share with producers of raw material, 
employees and consumers the economics affected by 
monopoly; (c) when it exacts dividends beyond what 
a fair return for investment justifies. It is an evil 
politically, (a) when it uses its power to corrupt 
the legislature or judiciary; (&) when it interferes 
with the exercise of the right of suffrage, or the selec- 
tion of candidates for political offices; (c) when it 
refuses to recognize lawful labor unions. It is an 
evil ethically, (a) when it compels railroad favorit- 
ism or special privileges from any common carrier, 
practises discriminative underselling, or employs 
factor agreements; (6) when it does not promote 
material prosperity equitably and distributively ; (c) 
when it induces the decay of individual initiative and 
independence, lessens business opportunity, concen- 
trates wealth in the hands of the few, fosters the 
abuse of industrial power and tends to the produc- 
tion of a proletariat. 

KEFEKENCES : Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. II, pp. 90- 
98 ; Ely, Monopolies and Trusts ; The Irish Theologi- 
cal Quarterly, July, 1908: The Moral Aspect of 
Monopoly, by Dr. Kyan. 



92 Digests of Lectures. 



XX.— SOCIETY. 

Society is a stable union of two or more for a common 
purpose attainable by co-operative activity. its material 
element is the constituent members ; its formal element, 
the bond which obliges them to social co-operation. 
Society is factitious when its nature, purpose and bond 
is fixed by man j it is natural, when these are fixed by 
the Moral Law or the Author of nature. The three 
natural societies are domestic, civil and religious ; the 
two latter are supreme in their respective spheres. the 
primary property of every natural society is authority, 
the range of which is fixed by the nature and purpose of 
the society. 



1. SOCIETY. The term is used in a conventional 
sense to signify a more favored or fashionable class 
of the community which pays particular attention to 
the forms of social intercourse, or in a natural sense 
to signify a collective body of persons forming a com- 
munity, or association. We use the word in the 
latter sense. It is the stable union of two or more 
socn, the union arising not merely from co-existence 
in the same place, nor from mere identity of purpose, 
whether such identity be known to the person prose- 
cuting the purpose or not, but by pursuit of a pur- 
pose which is common to all taken collectively, not 
merely distributively, which is consequently attain- 
able by the co-operative activity of those who con- 
jointly will it and work for it. The purpose is the 
common good as denned by the specific end of the 
particular society, and thereby the good of the in- 



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93 



dividuals who compose the society. The common 
good varies in comprehension with the kind of society. 
The material element is the subjects who, precisely 
as persons, are not determined to one rather than 
another society. The formal element is the bond 
that unites them in a determined kind of society, and 
obliges them to the social co-operation peculiar to 
the society. 

2. KINDS OF SOCIETY. Society is pactitious 
when its nature, i. e., its purpose, the means it uses, 
and its bonds are fixed by the agreement, either con- 
tractual or promissory of the persons who instituted 
it, or by legislative statute. It is natural when its 
nature is fixed by the moral law or the author of 
nature. The end of the first is a subsidiary and in- 
cidental good of life. The end of the second is an 
essential good of the race. The appeal of the first 
is to some men or classes of men; of the second to 
men generally. The former imperfectly actuates a 
social instinct; the latter perfectly. The perfect 
actuation may be inadequate when the society, 
though the appeal of its end is to men generally, has 
not within itself all the resources to realize the end ; 
it is adequate, when such resources are possessed. 

3. NATUKAL SOCIETIES are those which re- 
spond perfectly, either adequately or inadequately to 
the inborn aptitudes, inclinations and needs of the 
human race. These are three, domestic, civil, re- 
ligious. Domestic society starts from conjugal 
society, naturally evolves into parental society, 
and is completed usually by a society between the 
heads of parental society and servants. These three, 



94 



Digests of Lectures. 



or at least the first two combined, form domestic 
society (domus, the home). Civil society is com- 
posed of domestic society as its immediate material 
element, and provides for temporal well-being by pro- 
tecting rights, and insuring the means socially neces- 
sary for common prosperity. Eeligious society pro- 
vides for the spiritual well-being of man. Now, the 
worthy propagation of the race, its temporal and 
spiritual well-being are goods which respond to the 
natural aptitudes, impulses and needs of the human 
race. Both civil and religious society afford means 
which domestic society lacks for its well-being, and 
are themselves in their respective spheres self-com- 
petent. The ultimate and proper purpose of each 
is distinct from that of the other. Though these 
purposes are interlinked (colligantur) they can 
never be identical, nor from their union can a third 
unitary society be formed. 

4. AUTHOEITY is the right of the community to 
direct and compel the individual members to live in 
accord with the specific purpose of the society of 
which it is a prerogative. It is derived from the 
duty of the community, as such, to seek its specific 
purpose, and this in turn arises from the bond by 
which a number of persons are formally constituted 
a society. The very concept of society in which it is 
the duty of the community as such, and, therefore, 
of its members individually, to further its specific 
good involves the right in the community, as a pri- 
mary property of the community, to enforce this duty. 
The subject of authority is an individual person, a 
body of persons, or the whole community, depending 



Digests of Lectures. 



95 



on the nature and constitution of the society. There 
is an analogy between society and a human being. 
Both are composed of a material and formal element ; 
both have a directing and controlling faculty which 
resides in a special organ; both have rights and 
duties, and are, therefore, (in appropriate senses) 
persons. But this analogy cannot be pushed to 
parallelism, otherwise we fall into the materialistic 
extravagancies of Comte, Schoeffle, Spencer (The 
study of Sociology, Chs. 14 and 15) and Bluntschli. 

5. THE KANGE OF AUTHOEITY. The range of 
the right to compel obedience cannot be more or less 
extensive in the matter or over persons with which it 
deals than the duty from which it springs. But this 
duty arises from the bond that unites men in a 
specific society seeking a specific purpose by means 
which are suited to the purpose, and in character 
subordinate to it. Authority, therefore, is limited 
by the nature and constitution of the society in which 
it is exercised. 



96 Digests of Lectures. 



XXL— SOCIETY, CONJUGAL. 

Conjugal society is a contract properly so called, but 
differs from other contracts in that its nature, purpose 
and bond are determined by the author of nature. its 
primary intrinsic purpose is the procreation of rational 
beings, and its secondary purpose is the mutual love and 
aid of the contracting parties. its essential properties 
are unity and indissolubility. 



1. CONJUGAL SOCIETY is the stable union of a 
man and woman in community of life for the fitting 
procreation of children, and for mutual love and aids. 
It is a natural society, as is evidenced by the physio- 
logical and psychological faculties, tendencies and 
temperaments by which they are fitted and impelled 
to enter matrimony, and thus mutually complement 
one another in the constitution of an unitary prin- 
ciple of procreation and a social unit of love. It is a 
primary society, because it is primordial, historically 
and conceptually, and because naturally evolving 
into parental society it is primarily essential to the 
well-being of the race. 

2. CONTBACT. A contract is a formal agree- 
ment between two (or more) persons in which each 
binds himself or herself to do or forbear in favor of 
the other, and each acquires the right to what the 
other promises. But a conjugal society owes its 
existence to an agreement by which both parties 
freely, mutually and expressly promise to enter into 



Digests of Lectures. 



97 



a union, the purposes of which are defined by nature. 
It differs from other contracts in that its nature, 
purpose or bond is not determined by the contracting 
parties, who are free to make the contract or to ab- 
stain from making it, but cannot change its essential 
conditions. These are, that it should be in accord 
with the animal and rational nature of man. Any 
animal function of man that is performed in a man- 
ner unbefitting the dignity of a rational being be- 
comes bestial. 

3. PURPOSE AND END. Matrimony may be re- 
garded as an institution of nature, or as an inti- 
mate association of two in Community of life. 
Under the first aspect its extrinsic and regulative 
purpose is the well-being — not mere increase — of 
the race, and its intrinsic purpose is the procreation 
of children in a manner befitting rational nature and 
promoting the extrinsic purpose. Under the second 
aspect its purpose is the enduring attainment of 
what was the natural impulsive motive of its forma- 
tion, i. e., mutual love of head, heart and hand. Both 
are essential purposes; the first is primary in the 
sense that the second is intended by nature for the 
promotion and becoming realization of the first. 
Both being social, neither can be subordinated to the 
personal gratifications of one or other of the con- 
tracting parties. The secondary purpose affecting 
the mutual right of individuals should always be 
sought; the primary purpose, being the befitting 
growth of the race, and, therefore, not obligatory on 
individuals singly, but on the collective body, need 
not always be sought by each and every conjugal 



98 



Digests op Lectures. 



society; but it can never be frustrated by positive 
acts without contravening the laws of nature. 

The end of the conjugal society is that in which it 
naturally issues. But this is a rational being, who 
(a) possessing an immortal soul is destined for eter- 
nal blessedness, and possessing a rational spirit 
exists for the glory of his creator; (6) possessing a 
social nature is destined for co-operative life among 
his fellow-men. Hence, (a) conjugal society by its 
end is endowed with a natural sanctity and sacred- 
ness which connects it with religion ; (&) it has a hu- 
man consecration higher and wider than any given 
civil society, which it subserves only in so far as that 
civil society itself promotes the advance of the race. 

UNITY. The conjugal union of one man with 
one woman is a precept of the natural law, though 
not immediately evident. The reasons are : 1. From 
its secondary purpose it is a society of equals. The 
contracting parties contribute equally to the pur- 
poses of conjugal and parental society and have equal 
rights. In other forms of union the love given is 
not the love received. 2. The primary purpose of 
parental society, which grows naturally out of con- 
jugal society, is difficult of attainment in other forms 
of marital unions. 3. The extrinsic purpose, as his- 
tory witnesses, is best obtained in monogamous 
unions, and is hampered and retarded where poly- 
gamous unions prevail. 

4. INDISSOLUBILITY. The conjugal union is 
permanent during the life of the contracting parties. 
It can be dissolved neither by the contracting parties 
nor by any human authority, civil or ecclesiastic. 



Digests of Lectures. 



99 



Being a contract, conditions for its validity in accord 
with the good of the race may be put by the society 
to which it is subject. If these are not observed, the 
society can declare it null ab initio. Indissolubility 
is a prescription of the moral law, though not immed- 
iately evident, but more evident probably than the 
prescription of unity. The reasons are : 1. From the 
intrinsic purpose, that dissolubility of a valid union 
by either of the contracting parties or by a human 
authority would be adverse to the good of the race, 
as it destroys the fundamental unit of the civil 
society, lowers the moral standards of the community, 
and leads logically to free love, and thence to animal 
promiscuity. 2. It entirely frustrates the primary 
intrinsic purpose of parental society, and is, there- 
fore, a grave injury to the child. 3. It would nor- 
mally put the woman in an injurious position. 4. 
The reasons usually advanced for it, are based on 
abnormal egotism or animal passion. 

REFERENCES: Rickaby's God and His Crea- 
tures, Bk. Ill, Ch. 123 and 124. 



100 Digests of Lectures. 



XXII.— SOCIETY, PARENTAL. 

The primary intrinsic purpose of parental society is 
the education of the children who are members of it. 
to parents alone belongs the inherent right of educating 
their children. the duty from which this right springs 
may be enforced, should need arise. by civil and religious 

SOCIETY. 



1. PARENTAL SOCIETY is the natural out- 
growth of conjugal society. Its extrinsic purpose 
is the well-being of the race to be obtained by realiz- 
ing its intrinsic purpose, which is to fit children for 
their mission in life. Its bonds are parental love 
for those who are, as it were, their other selves : and 
filial reverence towards those who are the authors of 
their being. Parental society owes neither its origin 
nor continuance to a pact, as Rousseau and others 
held, nor to proprietary rights, as Kant seems to have 
held, but is derived from the natural relations be- 
tween the child and its parents, whose authority is 
defined by its intrinsic purpose. 

2. EDUCATION. In its proper sense the word 
signifies a process (or the result of a process ) of in- 
struction, training and discipline by which the physi- 
cal, mental and moral powers are suitably developed 
and rendered efficient for the duties of life. On the 
one side it is determined by the capacity for develop- 
ment of the individual, and on the other by the duties 
of life for which he is destined. The capacity for de- 
velopment may regard either the formative period of 



Digests op Lectures. 



101 



life or the evolved period. The duties of life are 
either common to all human beings, and are conse- 
crately fixed by the social environment in which they 
live, or are peculiar to particular individuals and to 
specialized social functions. Our question concerns 
the formative period and common duties of life. 
Every child that is brought into the world has a 
right to this. 

3. THE EIGHT OF EDUCATION. Education 
comprises the giving of information and formation, 
and for the sake of brevity, we confine the discussion 
to formation of intellect and will. Every one who is 
able has the right to give information, i. e., to impart 
knowledge, but this right implies no correlative duty 
on the part of the pupil, and, consequently, authority 
ad hoc on the part of the teacher. The right and 
authority to educate is founded on the duty of edu- 
cating, and this in turn, on the right of the child, to 
education. Primarily the child has a right to forma- 
tive and common education, and this right involves 
the duty and authority on the part of another. 

4. THE AUTHORITY TO EDUCATE. The in- 
herent right to educate belongs, (a) to those on whom 
the child has, by nature, the first claim; (6) on 
whom nature has imposed the duty, and, therefore, 
the authority to educate; (c) between whom and the 
child nature has put the closest bonds of mutual 
love and understanding. These are the parents 
alone. Proof, (a) By the action of the parents, the 
child is brought into the world in a condition of ex- 
treme physical, intellectual and moral want. (&) 
The parents are the authors of the child's existence, 



102 



Digests of Lectures. 



which is, as it were, a part of their own substance, 
and to whom, therefore, the child belongs, to be 
fashioned to manhood or womanhood, (c) Between 
the parents and the child whom they procreated there 
is the closest natural bonds ; hence in the parents the 
strongest other-regarding love, and in the child the 
strongest responsive love. Love of this kind neces- 
sarily implies a mutual practical understanding. 
Note: (a) that the authority of the parents over the 
child must be in accord with the personal dignity of 
the child, and the peculiar bond of love that unites 
them; (6) that the parents in educating the child 
should supplement their limitations by external aids ; 
(c) that the two natural and supreme societies, of 
which both parents and child are members, have au- 
thority in their respective spheres to protect the 
natural rights of the child, but not to invade the 
sphere of parental authority; (a) that the duty of 
supervising the scholastic companionship and instru- 
ments of formation is incumbent primarily on the 
parents. 

5. THE DUTIES OF THE STATE, (a) The 
state has the duty of prohibiting teaching subversive 
of public morality, and social order. It has not the 
right to determine in detail the curricula of studies, 
except in so far as it is necessary in order to safe- 
guard the natural rights of the child to a common 
and formative education, (b) It has the duty of 
providing schools and other accessories for formative 
and common education, when these can not be other- 
wise provided ; it has not the duty of supplying the 
means for advanced education beyond the formative 



Digests of Lectures. 



103 



period. It has no direct and much less exclusive au- 
thority over formative and common education. 

REFERENCES: Conway's The Respective Rights 
and Duties of the Church, Family and State Regard- 
ing Education. 



104 Digests op Lectures. 



XXIII.— SOCIETY, INDUSTRIAL. 

The proximate and individual norm of wages, due on 
grounds of commutative justice, is the net value of the 
work that the laborer produces | the supreme and gene- 
ral norm of wages, due on grounds of social justice, is 
the common welfare of the laboring class. 



1. INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. It is for the best 
interest of the civil community, that between em- 
ployers and employees, there should exist concord; 
and that by their mutual co-operation the material 
prosperity of each should be promoted; that their 
relation should be governed by benevolence and jus- 
tice. The causes that introduce discord between 
them, setting class against class ultimately redound 
to the injury of the whole community. These are 
radically ill-feeling and distrust, or injustice in the 
relation between wages paid and work done. 

2. LABOR, in a comprehensive sense, is an exer- 
tion of mind or body undergone wholly or mainly 
with a view to acquiring an outer good of life. It is 
industrial, either skilled or unskilled, ministrative, 
giving personal, domestic, business or professional 
service, or govern mental, pertaining to the public 
service. Our question is about industrial labor, which 
is the intelligent expenditure of muscular power on 
the matter and energies of nature, contributing di- 
rectly or indirectly to the production of specific 
utilities. Work is what is done by labor ; its purpose 



Digests op Lectures. 



105 



is to procure the necessities, comforts or luxuries of 
life. 

3. WAGES, as distinguished from salary, stipend, 
or fee, is the payment under contract for industrial 
work done for another. It differs from price paid 
for a commodity, because the laborer is a living be- 
ing whose wages are necessary for the conservation 
of existence and efficiency, and whose work is pri- 
marily directed to this purpose. Labor is not, there- 
fore, a mere market commodity. It differs from the 
hire of an animal, because the laborer is a person 
with the rights and duties, individual and social, of a 
person; his labor is his own, and of its nature de- 
stined for his own utility and the utility of those de- 
pendent on him. The iron law of wages regards 
him as a hired animal. The distinctive notes of 
wages, therefore, arise from the necessity and per- 
sonality of the laborer. 

4. THE NOKM. The contractural ralation be- 
tween laborer and employer is proximately individual 
and based on commutative justice: do ut des. It 
is ultimately social, affecting the welfare of the com- 
munity, and subject to the regulative pre-eminence 
of social justice. As a relation of commutative jus- 
tice the objective norm of it cannot be determined by 
mere contract, since this may fall below or rise above 
the demands of commutative justice; nor by the mar- 
ket value of labor, since this may be depressed or 
raised by artificial causes ; nor by personal or family 
needs, since these may exceed or be less than is due 
by commutative justice. In its social relation its 



106 



Digests of Lectures. 



supreme norm is determined by the welfare of the 
working class in frugal and becoming comfort. 

THE INDIVIDUAL NOEM. Commutative jus- 
tice is kept when equality is preserved between what 
is given and what is received. The thing contracted 
for is work in so far as it is directly or indirectly 
productive of utilities. This the laborer sells and 
the employer purchases, because thereby both obtain 
a benefit not therwise obtainable. ''Capital cannot 
do without labor ; nor Labor without Capital." The 
product of labor is gross or net, i. e., the sum total of 
what he produced, deducting the expenses of produc- 
tion. Therefore, deducting the cost of material, in- 
struments of production and taxes, of recompense 
due to the employer for his labor and expense in di- 
recting production and marketing the output, and of 
interest due for money invested, what remains be- 
longs to the workman. This, however, cannot be 
equitably fixed from day to day, but by the average 
value of products during periods varying from busi- 
ness depression to business prosperity or obtaining 
in normal economic conditions. 

5. THE SOCIAL NOKM. Social justice regulates 
the outward actions of men in their bearing on the 
common welfare. As a supreme norm it is directive 
of outward conduct in which equity between man and 
man is to be preserved ; as a general norm it is deter- 
minative of the relations that individuals or parts 
of the community should bear to the organized whole. 
But equity requires that the connatural right of liv- 
ing in accord with dignity of his personal nature, of 
enjoying namely the opportunity of subsisting in 



Digests op Lectures. 



107 



becoming comfort, of raising a family, of attending 
to his mental, moral and religious perfection, should 
have fair play. If the economic order denies this, 
it is out of accord with moral law. Again, the wel- 
fare of the community as a whole requires that the 
largest component of it should enjoy its equitable 
rights. If this is denied social discontent and dis- 
union, class hostility and conflicts arise, i. e., un- 
armed civil war. 

REFERENCES: The Encyclical Letters of Leo 
XIII ; The Condition of the Working Classes. Ryan's 
A Living Wage. 



108 Digests of Lectures. 



XXIV.— SOCIETY, CIVIL. 

The genetic oeigin of civil society is to be found in the 
inclination, aptitudes and needs of man | its historical 
origin, in the various facts that caused the aggregation 
of many men in the same territory | its juridical origin, 
in the consent either tacit or expressed, of those who 
instituted it. the distinction between people, nation 
and State. 



1. The existence of some form of civil society is 
an universal and uninterrupted fact of history. The 
homo solivagus is a figment or hypothetical assump- 
tion. An universal and constant fact is due to an 
universal cause. The contractu alists attribute it 
to the educational efficiency of experience. The 
evolutionists to natural impulse physically neces- 
sitating. The schoolman to natural impulse emo- 
tively necessitating. 1. The genetic origin is due 
to emotive causes operating on all men at all times, 
and impelling indeterminately to civil unions. Man 
has a natural fitness for civil society, evidenced by 
his social faculties; a natural inclination to it, evi- 
denced by his social inclinations ; and a natural need 
of it, evidenced by his physical, intellectual and moral 
wants, which cannot find relief outside of civil socie- 
ty. The genetic impulse is ultimately reducible 
neither to fear, as Hobbes held, nor to self-love as 
Rousseau held ; but to a rational love of self and oth- 
ers. It is neither purely altruistic nor purely egoistic. 
2.The genetic impulse has been historically actuated 
along different lines, and has produced different 



Digests of Lectures. 



109 



forms of civil society. The primary historical causes 
of these developments are four: unity of race; the 
common need of many unrelated families gathered 
from whatever cause in the same territory ; the social 
or military prepotency of one or more families com- 
pelling political subjection of others ; the special in 
fluence of religion, resulting in theocracy. Usually 
in the primary formation of civil society these causes 
intermingled, though one or other was predominant. 
3. Whatever the form of society, man recognizes that 
it is his duty to live and act in conformity with the 
dictates of social justice. The juridical origin of 
civil explains the existence — not the source — of this 
obligation. The material element of civil society is 
a multitude of persons living in the same place. The 
formal element is the bond that obliges them to live 
in accord with the purpose of civil society. 

2. THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL OBLIGATION. The 
material element of civil society may be considered : 
(a) as a multitude of persons co-existing in the same 
territory, (6) as bound by mutual obligations of be- 
nevolence, commutative or contractual justice, filial 
piety, and other virtues defining the moral relations 
between man and man or parents and children, (c) 
as bound by the common obligations of an organized 
political body. Historical causes gradually dispose 
and induce the multitude to assume the bond of social 
justice, they do not give it existence. Reasons: 1. 
Descent from a common father obliges the descend- 
ant only to filial piety and family love. 2. Terri- 
torial co-existence obliges only to the mutual social 
duties comprised under benevolence and justice. 3. 



110 



Digests of Lectures. 



Tenancy under a territorial lord obliges only — to re- 
spect for his right. 4. Military or other prepotence 
imposes no obligation on the weaker ; might does not 
originate right. Historical causes show the emotive 
and moral necessity of forming a civil society. But 
the moral necessity of entering a natural society, 
does not constitute one a member of it. 

The efficient cause which originally gives existence 
to the bond of social justice is the consent of th'! 
multitude or its natural representatives, either 
given expressly, or implicitly by actions freely posited 
and implying assent. This consent may be given by 
the practical acceptance of life in a growing com- 
munity that finally and gradually becomes a civil 
community or by formal agreement to a form of 
government. Social circumstances may be such that 
the multitude is morally obliged to give such con- 
sent and human nature is such that it inevitably will ; 
but until it is given, the bond of social justice does 
not exist. Proof. The genetic impulse to civii 
society must be actuated by some fact ; men are not 
by nature members of a concrete civil society. By 
nature, therefore, each man is politically equal and 
independent of others. Hence, the stable union of 
many seeking by their co-operative activity a common 
civil good must in the case of adults having the use 
of reason and free-will arise from their perception of 
its objective moral necessity and their fixed intention 
of realizing it. Such an intention is an act of tha 
will, or an explicit or implicit consent. 

This doctrine differs from that of the Contractu- 
alists, (a) in asserting that man is by nature a social 



Digests of Lectures. 



Ill 



being, and that civil society is a natural society; 
(6) in asserting that the bond of civil society, i. e., 
the obligation to social justice, though it owes its 
existence in one or other form of a political body to 
the consent of the constituting multitude, does not 
derive its obligatory nature from that consent; (c) 
in asserting that the genetic impulse is not accidental 
to human nature, arising from the education of ex- 
perience and directed merely to self-protection or 
self-betterment, but essential to human nature, and 
ultimately directed to the temporal welfare of the 
race to be obtained by the temporal welfare of the 
individuals constituting the race. 

3. POLITICAL DESIGNATIONS. People, an 
aggregate actually existing in an organized political 
community, and constituting its material element; 
sometimes applied to an aggregate that once had 
political existence and yet retains territorial unity. 
Nation, a people precisely as organized in a political 
unity, bound by civil obligation, and endowed with at 
least the internal rights of sovereignty, but consid- 
ered in abstraction from its government. State, the 
body politic in its entirety comprising the material 
element, i. e., the people; the formal element, i. e., 
their union by the bond of social justice; and a dis- 
tinctive form of government. 



112 Digests op Lectures. 

XXV.— THE END OF THE STATE. 



The state is not an end to itself, but exists foe the 
temporal well-being of the community. its primary 
purpose is to secure the rights and liberty of its members, 
and its secondary purpose is to afford equitably the op- 
portunities socially necessary for temporal prosperity. 



1. AN END IN ITSELF. A person, either physi- 
cal or moral, is said to be an end in itself ; (a) nega- 
tively in the sense that being sui juris is cannot be 
regarded as directly subordinated inworth to another 
person; (&) positively in the sense that its own pres- 
ervation and growth is the ultimate purpose of its ex- 
istence to which its constituent elements are subordi- 
nate and referable. The State is an end to itself in 
the first sense, because it is a supreme natural so- 
ciety. It is not an end to itself in the second sense, 
because the citizens are not for the sake of the State, 
but the State for the sake of the social purpose of 
the citizens, as manifested by the genetic impulses 
that impelled men to form society ; because the state 
is not an entity abstracted and distinct from, and 
superior to the people that compose it. We reject, 
therefore, Hegelian theories of the state. The same 
principles apply to other abstractions like Society, 
Humanity, The Race. A comparison between the 
relations of citizens and state, and of soldier and 
army. 



Digests of Lectures. 



113 



2. THE END OF THE STATE. The proper pur- 
pose of the State is to realize in the temporal order 
that which the social impulses and needs of man de- 
mand, and which outside of the state cannot be per- 
manently and efficiently obtained. But this is tem- 
poral welfare, (a) by security in their rights to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of temporal well-being; (b) 
by opportunity to acquire a stable sufficiency of the 
goods of this life. Both are essential purposes. The 
theory of Kant, Spencer and others who confine the 
purpose of the State to securing rights is — except as 
a protest against state paternalism — untenable. It 
ignores the natural sociability of human nature, the 
fact that men live in community of life, because it 
satisfies their inclinations, gives play to their apti- 
tudes, and enables them to satisfy needs which can be 
satisfied only in society. This theory which makes 
the purpose of state simply the protection of men 
from ore another is appropriately called by the Ger- 
mans POLIZIESTAAT-THEORIE. 

3. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE is one which im- 
mediately concerns the preservation of the social 
bond, without which other purposes cannot be ob- 
tained, and which it is the direct duty of the state 
to secure. This is social peace and tranquillity, i. e., 
protection against external foes and immunity from 
internal discord. The primary purpose is not the 
paramount purpose, i. e., that which is ultimately 
intended, but that which is primarily necessary in 
order that through the prevention or removal of so- 
cial disorder the community may seek in harmony 
advance in temporal prosperity. 



114 



Digests op Lectures. 



4. THE SECONDARY PURPOSE completes the 
primary purpose. By temporal prosperity is under- 
stood not only material prosperity, but also intel- 
lectual, artistic and moral perfection in so far as 
these add to the temporal well-being and happiness 
of the community. It is socially necessary, (a) in 
the sense that it regards general necessity or supreme 
utility, (6) in the sense that it can be obtained by the 
state alone, or by the state in a way far superior to 
that of private effort or co-operation. It affords 
opportunity, i. e., it does not provide individual citi- 
zens, or classes of citizens with the means of procur- 
ing temporal prosperity, but offers to all such social 
conditions as give free play to personal initiative and 
enterprise. 

5. THEORIES OF THE STATE'S PURPOSE. 
Apart from the Hegelian theory that subordinates 
the individual citizens to the existence and evolution 
of an abstract entity personified as the State, there 
are three theories of the state's purpose. The Kan- 
tian theory that tends to the development of exces- 
sive police power ; the Paternal theory that tends to 
the increasing dependence of citizens on the state for 
individual prosperity; the theory of the Schoolmen 
that limits the powers of the States to the protection 
of natural rights, the providing or regulating of pub- 
lic utilities, and the supervision and fostering of so- 
cial conditions affording equitable and potentially 
universal opportunity for its citizens. It acts ultra 
vires, i. e., beyond the charter given by nature when 
on the plea of the "common good" it invades indi- 
vidual, family, or class rights, or takes upon itself 



Digests of Lectures. 



115 



the care of private morality or health as such, or, 
opposes the exercise of religious belief not out of 
accord with moral law. It has no jurisdiction over 
the acts of the citizens, except in so far as these are 
socially externalized, and become injurious to the 
life, liberty or property of others ; or to the efficiency 
or permanence of the state; or seriously and detri- 
mentally affects the conditions of social prosperity. 



116 Digests of Lectures. 



XXVI — THE NATURE OF CIVIL 
AUTHORITY. 

Civil authokity, the organ of which is the Govern- 
ment, IS AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF THE STATE. It CAN OBLIGE 

in conscience only so far as it is ultimately derived 
from the Supreme Legislator. 



1. AUTHORITY. There are two meanings of the 
word : the superior knowledge conjoined with verac- 
ity of one, which is the ground of another's intellec- 
tual submission; the superior moral power or the 
right of one, which is the ground of another's voli- 
tional submission. We use it in the latter sense. It 
may be denned : the right of effectively directing the 
members of a community to its proper and specific 
end. It is parental, civil, ecclesiastical. It must re- 
side in a subject. This subject, whether the members 
of society taken collectively, a selected body, or an 
individual person is the government. The govern- 
ment has therefore two rights : the right of authority, 
and the right of exclusive possession and exercise of 
authority. Hence two questions : whence comes au- 
thority as such, and whence comes the right of the 
subject to possess and exercise it. 

2. THE RIGHT OF AUTHORITY. There are 
four theories: The Anarchists whether philosophi- 
cal, as Proudhon, or revolutionary, as Rakunim, deny 
the right of authority ; the Contracturalists regard 
it as the summation or resultant of individual rights 



Digests of Lectures. 



117 



arising from a primitive contract, either actual or 
constructive ; the Evolutionists hold it to be a social 
power produced by superorganic evolution, much as 
biological powers are produced by organic evolution ; 
the Schoolmen hold it to be a property of civil so- 
ciety, which as being a natural society, receives its 
nature and attributes from the Author of nature. 

3. PROOF OF OUR THEORY. The right of effec- 
tively directing others to a specific end, necessarily 
presupposes the duty of those others to co-operate to 
the attainment of the end. Civil authority, there- 
fore, presupposes in the members of a civil society 
the duty of social justice, and is derived from and 
measured by that duty. But this duty, assuming the 
existence of civil society, has its source in the right 
of the supreme Legislator of obliging those who are 
members of a natural society to work for the pur- 
poses of that society. Therefore, the right of au- 
thority is ultimately derived from the Supreme Leg- 
islator. Hence government can oblige in conscience 
only in so far as the members of civil society are 
antecedently bound by the moral law, and conse- 
quently bound by an authority that has the right to 
declare and define the conditions of social justice. 

4. THE OTHER THEORIES : Anarchism by de- 
nying the right of authority, denies social justice, 
and the social nature of man; the Contracturalists 
deny any motive for obedience to law except fear or 
self-interest, and consequently the social nature of 
man. The Evolutionists admit the social nature of 
man, but cannot raise the duty of obedience about 
the instinct of the herd. 



118 



Digests of Lectures. 



5. THE EIGHT OF GOVERNMENT. There are 
three theories : (a) The right of government is imme- 
diately from God by divine but positive designation, 
as in the case of Saul in the theocracy of Israel, the 
divine rights of kings; (6) The right of government 
is immediately from God by natural designation, as 
in the case of parental authority, a milder form of 
the "divine rights" theory, (c) Authority itself is 
from God, but its inhesion in one or other subject, 
i. e., the right of Government is from the people, who 
are and always remain the radical depository of it; 
and from whom it passes to a determined form of 
government, which thereby secures an inviolable right 
to the possession and use of authority in keeping with 
the constitution that determines its tenure and ex- 
tent. 

6. PROOF. The right of civil authority is of its 
nature radically in that subject to whom belongs the 
right of attaining the end of civil society and of pro- 
viding the means thereto. But this is the people. 
The people, however, are incapable of direct and 
effective exercise of it, except in communities in 
which the members are comparatively few in num- 
ber, and upright in regard for social justice ; other- 
wise "the will of the people" may be adverse to the 
ends of social justice. To attain the end of civil so- 
ciety, the people should therefore pass the right of 
authority to a form of government best fitted to at- 
tain the ends of social justice. This government, 
therefore, exists by the express or tacit consent of the 
people. 



Digests of Lectures. 



119 



7. THE FOKMULA : "Governments are instituted 
among men, deriving their just power from the con- 
sent of the governed/' may have two senses: (a) the 
contractualist sense, that "the will of the people" 
is the original source of authority; (b) the scholastic 
sense that the powers of government are only just 
when derived by the expressed or tacit consent of the 
people from the duty incumbent on the people itself 
of social justice. The first sense leads to tyranny, 
the second to right government. 



120 



Digests op Lectures. 



XXVII. — GOVERNMENT, 
THE FUNCTIONS AND FORM. 

Functions of government are legislative, judicial and 
executive. The purposes of government are best ob- 
tained WHEN THESE FUNCTIONS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN DIFFERENT 
DEPOSITORIES, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRESERVE THE ORGANIC 
UNITY OF THE STATE. No FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS WITHOUT DE- 
FECTS. The best form is that which is suited to the 

POLITICAL CAPACITY AND CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE AS DETER- 
MINED BY HISTORICAL CAUSES. GENERALLY SPEAKING, FOR THE 
POLITICAL TEMPERAMENT OF MODERN PEOPLES THIS IS BEST EF- 
FECTED IN A CONSTITUTIONAL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 



1. THE FUNCTIONS of government regard the 
future, past or present conditions of social order and 
temporal prosperity. In view of the primary pur- 
pose of the State they are: {a) to define and pre- 
scribe the internal and external conditions necessary 
for the security of social order; (6) to decide contro- 
versies arising from these prescriptions, and deter- 
mine their violations and vindicate them; (c) to 
manage the affairs of the State in keeping with these 
prescriptions and the decisions that determine their 
concrete applications. In view of the secondary pur- 
pose they are: (a) to define and prescribe the condi- 
tions of temporal prosperity; (6) to decide contro- 
versies regarding the applications of these prescrip- 
tions, (c) to put these prescriptions into effect. 

The first function under both heads is philosophi- 
cally speaking, legislative, i. e., general and pros- 
pective. Legislative functions are therefore to make 
civil and criminal laws, to assign sanctions for 



Digests of Lectures. 



121 



laws, to give interpretations of laws, to make treaties 
and declare war; to make fiscal and economic laws, 
to impose tribute or taxes, to define the uses of State 
monies, to provide public utilities socially necessary, 
to grant charters. The second function under both 
heads is, philosophically speaking, judicial, and is in 
general to decide in the concrete all controversies re- 
garding violations of legislative prescriptions, and to 
impose penalties according to the sanctions fixed by 
the legislative power. The third function under both 
heads is, philosophically speaking, executive, i. e., 
to give execution to legislative enactments and ju- 
dicial decisions, and to administer the affairs of 
government in accordance with laws, their interpre- 
tation, or the decision of the judicial power. 

2. LAWS. Civil law when rightly promulgated 
binds in conscience either to the positing or omitting 
the actions prescribed or proscribed ; or if they are 
purely penal laws, to paying the penalty after sen- 
tence of the judiciary. For they are: (a) either 
declarations of a moral obligation already existing or 
determinations of conditions fitted for the protection 
of social order; (6) necessary for attaining the pur- 
poses of Civil Society; (c) made by an authority ulti- 
mately derived from the Supreme Legislator. Civil 
laws not conforming to these canons do not bind in 
conscience. The subject matter of civil law is not 
the common good without qualification, but the com- 
mon good as defined by the primary and secondary 
purposes of civil society, namely, actions socially ex- 
ternalized, which gravely affect the rights and liber- 
ties of others, of the State's function of furthering 
temporal prosperity. With the private morality or 



122 



Digests op Lectures. 



well-being ? as such, of the citizen the State has no 
concern ; its laws should be accommodated to the nat- 
ural conditions and the moral development of the 
community. 

3. THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. The simple 
forms of government are democracy, aristocracy and 
monarchy. The mixed forms are those in which one 
of the simple forms is modified and tempered by the 
others. Modern representative government is a 
mixed form in which at least the members of the 
lower legislative house are directly chosen by the 
people. In our federal government, the House of 
Representatives is directly chosen by the people, its 
functions are mainly legislative, the exception being 
the judicial function of impeaching civil officers of 
the United States, but it does not possess the fulness 
of legislative power; the Senate is directly* chosen 
by the people, its functions are legislative, executive 
and judicial in cases of impeachment ; the President 
is indirectly chosen by the people, his functions are 
executive, legislative through his veto powers, and 
the power of making treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, and judicial through his power 
of granting reprieve and pardon. The Constitution 
of U. S., unlike the constitution of a State, is a 
grant of power. A State possesses all powers in- 
herent to civil authority, unless it is deprived of some 
by restrictions in the fundamental law or constitu- 
tion. 

No form of government is without defects. The 
best form of government is that which is suited to the 



* By Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, proclaimed 
May 31, 1913. 



Digests of Lectures. 



123 



political capacity and character of the people as de- 
termined by historical causes, and in which authority 
is so exercised, and liberty so secured as to inspire 
citizens with loyalty. For the political temperament 
of modern people at least this is best effected in a 
constitutional and representative government, in 
which the functions of government are distributed in 
different departments, but in such a way as to pre- 
serve organic unity, (a) Loyalty is greater when the 
citizens have political power. (&) Freedom is safer 
where government is limited by a constitution, (c) 
Effectiveness in government is better secured when 
functions calling for different habits of mind are ap- 
propriately distributed, and rights are better safe- 
guarded when two or more of these functions are not 
in the hands of one man or body of men. (d) Or- 
ganic unity is preserved when these functions in all 
their exercises are not separated in different deposi- 
tories, but interlinked in such a way as to mutually 
restrain one another. 

4. DISTRIBUTIONS OF FUNCTIONS IN U. S. 
The functions of the House of Representatives are, 
with one exception, legislative, but it does not possess 
the fulness of the legislative power; of the Senate 
are legislative, judicial and executive; of the judici- 
ary, judicial and legislative by interpreting laws; of 
the President, executive, legislative by the power of 
veto, and judicial by granting pardon and reprieve. 

REFERENCES. Willoughby's The Government 
and Administration of the U. S. Rickaby's Aquinas 
Ethicus, Vol. 1, pp. 286-300. Woodrow Wilson, the 
State, Ch. XI. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la. 
2ae, question 105, Art. 1. 



124 Digests of Lectures. 



XXVIIL— THE CHURCH AND THE 
STATE. 

Though church and state are in their respective 
spheres perfect and independent societies, the absolute 
irrelation of both is impossible, and attempts to effect 
it are against the moral law. 



1. CHURCH AND STATE. Assuming that re- 
ligion is not a mere emotional product, but a habit 
of will based on intellectual assent to certain truths 
which define our dependence on and our duties to 
our creator, we understand by the church a body of 
believers co-operatively professing these truths, 
symbolically expressing them by a ritual, and practis- 
ing the duties they inculate. In view of the unitary 
character of religious truth and purpose there can be 
but one church, though, apart from a divine revela- 
tion ; there might be many rituals, and one section of 
believers might more thoroughly grasp and ritually 
more perfectly express the truths of religion than 
another. Complete spiritual well-being and happi- 
ness of its members is the ultimate and specific pur- 
pose of the church, which has within itself the means 
of realizing its purpose. The Church is, therefore, 
a perfect society, supreme in its own order. Socie- 
ties are said to be independent, (a) when the end of 
one is not per se a means to the end of the other, and 
(5) when the activity of one is not directly subject 
to the jurisdiction of the other. But the Church, and 



Digests of Lectures. 



125 



State, which, as we have seen, is also a perfect Society 
and supreme in its own order, are in this sense inde- 
pendent of one another. 

2. THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND 
STATE. The subjects of both church and State are 
the same, i. e., the same persons are subject to the 
jurisdiction of each, and destined by nature to the 
purpose of each. But the absolute irrelation of two 
Supreme Societies having jurisdiction over the same 
subjects is impossible, and the absolute irrelation of 
two Supreme Societies, the members of which are 
destined by nature to attain the purpose of each can 
not be attempted without impugning a law founded in 
nature. Moreover, the purpose of each is more fully 
realized by mutual aid; temporal prosperity is more 
secure when right is reinforced by religion, and re- 
ligious welfare is promoted by temporal means. At- 
tempts to divorce absolutely the interests of Church 
and State are, therefore, against the moral law. 

3. THEORETIC RELATIONS. There are three 
theories: (1) Extreme European Liberalism, which 
holds that the State, as such, ignores God, and seeks 
its end irrespective of religion. Pushed to its logical 
conclusions this means: (a) that civil society does 
not derive its authority from the Supreme Legislator 

( b ) that the State is the ultimate fount of all rights, 

(c) that the Church is not a supreme society and has 
no right beyond those conceded or permitted to it by 
the State, (d) that when "public policy" requires, 
the spiritual should be sacrificed to State welfare. 
(2) Moderate European Liberalism which admits 
that Church and State are each a supreme society, 



126 



Digests op Lectures. 



but holds that each should pursue its purpose uncon- 
cerned with or unhindered by the other. But this 
supposes the absolute irrelation of both to be practi- 
cable. (3) Catholic Doctrine, Church and Statue 
are independent, yet their interest are interlinked be- 
cause of the identity of membership and the unity of 
human life. 

4. SUBORDINATION is the relation of one order 
to another which is higher than it in some attribute. 
The attribute determines the kind of subordination. 
It is direct, when the purpose of the lower order is a 
means partially conducting to the realization of that 
of the higher order. Such subordination when exist- 
ing between social bodies entails jurisdiction of the 
higher over the lower, whether the higher derives its 
existence from the lower or not. It is indirect when 
the purpose of one order is lower in grade and worth 
than that of another, but the orders themselves are in- 
dependent of one another in nature and rights. In- 
direct subordination is either positive or negative: 
positive, when the lower order, though independent, 
is such by nature that its purpose when rightly 
sought aids the purpose of the higher, and it is so 
correlated with the higher, because of the reciprocal 
bearing of the well-being of one on the other, that it 
must, for its own highest welfare, promote the in- 
terest of the higher; negative, when the purpose of 
one has no immediate relation to the purpose of the 
other. Now, (a) neither Church nor State is di- 
rectly subordinate to the other ; this would imply de- 
pendence of one on the other, would negate the su- 
premacy in their respective spheres of one or the 



Digests of Lectures. 



127 



other. ( b ) The purpose of the Church is of a higher 
order than the purpose of the State, (c) The State 
should so order the exercise of its activities as not to 
antagonize the spiritual welfare of its subjects ; and 
(d) as to render the practice of religion safe and 
easy. Much misapprehension has arisen from the use 
of the ambiguous phrases "Union" or "Separation" 
of Church and State. 

5. ACTUAL RELATION. The theoretic rela- 
tions are under modern condition unrealizable, be- 
cause of the diversity of religions. Hence, we hold 
(a) that a State may not by force destroy the unity 
of religion already prevailing, nor by force compel its 
citizens to profess one religion; (&) that where re- 
ligious tolerance or equality is established by funda- 
mental law it must be respected by citizens and 
government. The State's tolerance or neutrality 
does not extend to cults in which the well-being of 
the people is evidently and seriously threatened 
whether that well-being be material, intellectual or 
moral. 

REFERENCES: Encyclical of Leo XIII on the 
Christian Constitution of States. Devas' Key to the 
World's Progress, Part II, Ch. IV. Rickaby's 
Aquinas Ethicus, pp. 328-331. 



128 Digests of Lectures. 



XXIX.— THE STATE AND CON- 
SCIENCE. 

Liberty of conscience, properly understood, is a con- 
natural AND INALIENABLE RIGHT OF MAN. In THE EXTERNAL 
EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT THE CITIZEN MAY NOT BE CONSTRAINED 
BY THE CIVIL AUTHORITY, THOUGH HE MAY BE RESTRAINED BY 
THIS AUTHORITY WHENEVER SUCH EXERCISE IS SERIOUSLY 
HARMFUL TO THE GENERAL WELFARE. 



1. LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE. By conscience 
is understood the reasoning faculty in so far as it 
distinguishes between right and wrong, reveals obli- 
gation, and dictates to will. Liberty of conscience is 
immunity of this faculty from necessity. Much am- 
biguity attends the phrase. It may refer to the inner 
acts of reason or volition or to the outer acts of con- 
duct. Regarding the inner acts it may mean: (a) 
that reason in making a moral judgment is free to 
reach any conclusion that pleases; (&) that the will 
is free from any necessity compelling volition. The 
first is freedom of thought ; is destructive of all cer- 
tainty, makes reason the slave of emotion, and is ir- 
rational. The second is a psychological fact already 
proved and admitted. Regarding outer acts it may 
mean: (a) immunity from obligation or from any 
moral or legal bond by which one is prevented from 
speaking or acting in accordance with one's arbitrary 
and personal judgments; (b) immunity from exter- 
nal compulsion in following outwardly the reasoned 



Digests op Lectures. 



129 



dictates of conscience. The first is moral lawlessness, 
and has never been maintained unconditionally by 
any one possessing the use of reason. The latter is 
the proper sense of the phrase. In this sense con- 
science has two aspects. It dictates the omission of 
an act, which is judged to be evil, or the positing of 
an act which is judged to be good. We maintain 
that no one can be constrained to posit an act which 
his reasoned conscience judges to be evil, even when 
his conscience is erroneous, provided it is invincibly 
so ; but that he may be restrained from positing an 
act which he judges to be good whenever the positing 
of such an act would be gravely injurious to the so- 
cial welfare, or when it would be a direct violation 
of another's equipollent right. 

2. THE RIGHT. Liberty of conscience, as ex- 
plained, is an absolute inalienable, and indefeasible 
right. Blackstone recognized three absolute rights : 
to life or personal security, to freedom of going or 
coming, or of employing oneself as one pleases, to 
the pursuit of temporal well being. Modern juris- 
prudence recognizes the right to liberty of con- 
science, though it was denied in 1854 by the Supreme 
Court of Maine (Donohue vs. Richards, 38 Maine), 
and by some other State Courts it has been treated 
in effect as a relative right, the exercise of which may 
be conditioned by statutory enactments. 

3. PROOF. An absolute right is one which is 
not conditioned on any civil enactments, or fact su- 
pervening on existence, and which in the present case 
is essential to the moral well being and moral dignity 



130 



Digests of Lectures. 



of a person. But the right of abstaining from out- 
ward acts which one honestly judges to be evil, or of 
performing acts which one honestly judges to be 
good, when these are not injurious to the community 
or others, has these attributes. An inalienable 
fright is one which arising from an unconditional 
duty a person cannot dispossess himself of. But 
the right to liberty of conscience is such, since it is 
essential to the attainment of one's final destiny, 
namely the promotion of God's glory through the 
attainment of the ultimate perfection of one's ra- 
tional nature. An indefeasible right is one which 
cannot be set aside or made void by any authority. 
But no authority can dispossess a moral being of the 
right of following the dictates of conscience. 

4. CONSTRAINT AND RESTRAINT. Conscience 
either prohibits a mode of conduct or prescribes it. A 
prohibition is of its nature unconditioned and obliges 
always and in every circumstances : a prescription is 
necessarily conditioned by other prescriptions, and 
obliges when circumstances demand and permit. Two 
prohibitions mutually conflicting cannot come from 
the same law ; two prescriptions may apparently con- 
flict, because of the superior good that one or other 
prescribes. Now constraint by which a person is com- 
pelled to posit an act which his reasoned judgment 
declares to be wrong is clearly a violation of liberty 
of conscience. But when there is a conflict between 
his judgment that an act should be posited and the 
reasoned judgment of upright men that such an ac- 
tion is injurious to the good of the community or a 
direct violation of another's equipollent right, public 



Digests op Lectures. 



131 



authority may proscribe those acts, since they are 
dictated by an erroneous and unreasonable con- 
science. The case of the Quakers whom conscience 
forbids to take part in war, and the Mormons, whose 
conscience approves the practice of polygamy, illus- 
trate the two principles. Perpetual and complete 
sacrifice of individual good, prescribed by right con- 
science, could not be prescribed by authority without 
entailing inherent contradiction in law, either moral, 
civil or ecclesiastical. 



132 



Digests of Lectures. 



XXX.— INTERNATIONAL RIGHT. 

Nations as well as individuals are subject to moral 
law, and have certain ethical and juridical duties with 
corresponding rights. international law governs the re- 
lations existing between independent nations*, and com- 
prises both the principles, which right reason preceives 
to be consonant with humanity and justice, and such 
definitions and determination of these as may be es- 
tablished by general consent. 



1. THE PERSONALITY OF THE STATE. Two 
extreme opinions have been advanced to explain the 
nature of the state: A mechanical theory, which 
likens it to an elaborate piece of mechanism, of which 
the individuals form parts and their summed rights 
the motive power. These mutually adjusted and 
modifying one another give a resultant which is the 
authority of the state — Rousseau and contractualist 
generally. A biological theory, which asserts a "fun- 
\ ? damental parallelism and kindship" between the bio- 
logical structure of an animal organism and the 
sociological structure of the state — Comte, Spencer 
in his earliest works, and the older evolutionists gen- 
erally. The scholastic theory compares the state to 
a living organism between which and it there exist 
a figurative analogy. The state is a natural society, 
though it receives its concrete form from the voli- 
tional activities of those who compose it. As a nat- 
ural entity it is composed of parts, bound together 
by the obligation of social justice, each of which re- 



Digests of Lectures. 



133 



tains its personal liberty of action, but co-operates 
to the purpose of that of which it is a part. Like a 
physical person, it has duties determined by its pur- 
pose and rights to secure and safeguard its well-being 
and the means thereto. In an appropriated sense it 
is, therefore, a "person." 

2. SOVEREIGNTY. It belongs to the essential 
dignity of personality that a person (a) should for 
the purposes of his existence have supreme control 
over his members and faculties, (6) should be sui 
juris, i. e., not a means to any other person, inde- 
pendent within the rights of personality of other 
persons, and within the same range not subject to 
their authority, (c) should be treated with the re- 
spect due to one having a destiny of his own, and be- 
ing sui juris in the prosecution of that destiny. 
Analogously, therefore, the sovereignty of the states 
involves authority within its sphere and as defined 
by its end over its citizens and resources, the fulness 
of civil power inherent in the concept of state, inde- 
pendence of political subjection to other states and a 
public majesty by reason of which a reverence is to be 
shown it commensurate with its dignity as a political 
personality. The fundamental subject of sovereignty 
is the organized political community; its proximate 
subject varies with the form of government. There 
is a special difficulty with regard to the proximate 
subject of sovereignty in a federated state strictly so 
called. There is a difference between an alliance of 
states leagued for mutual interests each of which re- 
tains its full sovereignty, though delegating the exer- 
cise of it in matters defined by the terms of the 



134 



Digests of Lectures. 



league to a general government, and a union of 
states by which is constituted a federal government 
itself sovereign within the powers granted it by the 
act of union. The former is usually designated a 
confederation, a staatenbund; the latter a federa- 
tion, bundesstaat — though English usage in the use 
of the terms is not wholly fixed. The question of 
sovereignty causes no difficulty in a confederation, 
since the general government is only the agent of 
the leagued states. In a federation, however, there is 
a division of sovereign powers, while sovereignty is 
theoretically indivisible. There is a distinction be- 
tween sovereignty itself and its various functions. 
The former is indivisible, and has one common sub- 
ject; the latter may be distributed in many. So 
far as international relations are concerned, a fed- 
eral government is sovereign and supreme over the 
constituent states. 

3. STATES AND MORAL LAW. The claims of a 
state are based either on force, expediency or reason. 
The claims of expediency can be sustained only by 
force or reason. The alternatives bases, therefore, 
of the rights of a state are either force or reason. 
But the first identifies might with right, and ren- 
ders rights unstable and varying. The second is 
only the expression of moral law. The rights of a 
state, therefore, are based on reason, and ultimately 
derived from the moral law revealed by reason and 
applied by it to the contingencies of life. The sub- 
ject of rights is a person, physical or social. Rights 
have their source in moral responsibility. Moral re- 
sponsibilities supposes duties. Duties are either 



Digests of Lectures. 



135 



those of benevolence or justice. A state, therefore, 
as a natural society and social person has towards 
other states the duties of benevolences and justice. 

4. INTERNATIONAL LAW is a body of duties 
and rights by which nations are mutually and moral- 
ly bound. It must be distinguised from the jus 
gentium of the schoolmen. It is either natural or 
positive. Positive international law, like positive 
civil law, is either a more definite declaration of an 
already existing natural or moral law recognized by 
reason, or a determination of conditions required for 
the uniform and general practice of international in- 
tercourse and the practical safeguarding of inter- 
national duties and right. It comprises, therefore, 
principles which right reason perceives to be conso- 
nant with humanity and justice, and such definitions 
and determination of these as are established by gen- 
eral consent. 

The primary duty of a nation towards other na- 
tions is to treat them with the benevolence, respect 
and justice due to an equal sovereign personality. 
Its primary rights are the rights of self-preservation, 
of self-development, of independence, and self-con- 
trol, of territorial dominion and of a voice in matters 
affecting the community of nations. 

REFERENCES : History of the theory of Sover- 
eignty since Rousseau, Merriam ; Theory of the state. 
Bluntschli, Bk. VI, Ch. XXIV, and Bk. VII, Ch. 1 -3 : 
Droit Natural, Taparelli, LIV. b. 



INDEX 



ACT, first or voluntary, sec- 
ond or volitional, 15 ; good, 
indifferent, evil, 32. 

Action, end of, 24; having a 
good and bad effect, 67. 

Adoration, divine worship, 60. 

Agent, end of, 24. 

Appetencies, natural, 16; cog- 
nitive and appetitive, 25. 

Authority, two meanings of, 
116; a right, 94; range of, 
95. See Civil Authority. 

BAD, see Good. 
Behavior, 19. 

Being, necessary and contin- 
gent, Ethical postulate, 13. 

Blessedness, 25 ; unchanging, 
unending, 26 ; attainable, 27 ; 
the absolutely ultimate in- 
trinsic end of man, 26; ob- 
tainable only through knowl- 
edge and love of God, 27. 
See Eudaemonism. 

CHARACTER, notion of, 55 ; 
an integration of habits of 
conduct, 9, 56; perfect, 58. 

Choice, 18. 

Church, 124; a perfect, su- 
preme and independent soci- 
ety, 124; and State, relations 
between, 125. 

Civil Authority, theories re- 
garding, 116 ; as a right from 
God, 117; as a possession 
from the people, 118. See 
Government. 



Civil laws, why and when 
binding, 121. 

Civil society, origin as ex- 
plained by Contractualists, 
Evolutionists, Schoolmen, 
108 ; genetic, historical, and 
juridical origin of, 108. 

Collectivism, 84; rejected, 85. 

Confederation, 133 ; see Feder- 
ation. 

Conjugal society, natural and 
primary, 96 ; a contract, 96 ; 
twofold aspect, and end un- 
der each, 97; unity, 98; in- 
dissolubility, 98. 

Conscience, 41, 128; certainty 
of through reflex principles, 
41 ; liberty of, rightly under- 
stood, 128 ; liberty of, an ab- 
solute and inalienable right, 
129 ; may not be constrained 
by authority, may be re- 
strained, 130. 

Consent, 18. 

Conduct, 8 ; elements of, 18. 
Criterion and norm of moral- 
ity, 31. 

Cults, civil equality and toler- 
ance of, 127. 
Custom (Ethos), 8. 

DECLARATION of Independ- 
ence regarding right of Gov- 
ernment, 119. 

Defence of rights, and modera- 
tion to be used, 77. 

Deliberation, 18. 



138 



INDEX. 



Determinism, psychological, 
15 ; economic, 87. 

Disposition, 55. 

Doubt, rational, emotional, 41 ; 
of law and of means for 
carrying out law, 42. 

Duties, 52. 56 ; to God, 58 ; in 
respect of self, 63. 72; re- 
garding life, 67 ; and health, 
64, 70; regarding outer 
goods of life, 65 ; to others. 
75. 

EDUCATION, 100; right and 
authority to educate. 101 ; 
duties of State with respect 
to, 102. 

End, 23 ; divisions of. 23 ; re- 
lation to nature, 24 ; the ul- 
timate intrinsic end of man. 
26, For end of Conjugal. 
Parental. Civil Societies see 
sub vocibus. 

Ethics, definition, 7 ; deriva- 
tion of name, 8 : intuitional 
and empirical. 10 ; subject 
matter of, 9, 18; formal 
principle, 21. 

Eudaemonism, 30. 

Equality of religious cults, 
civil and political, 127. 

Equality of rights, real and 
personal, 57. 

Executive functions of govern- 
ment, 121. 

FACT, the Ethical. 7: ele- 
ments of, 8. 

Federation, 134. See Confed- 
eration. 

Forms of Government, simple 
and mixed, 122 ; best form 
of, 122. 

Fortitude, 58. 

Freedom, various meaning of. 
13; of will. Ethical postu- 
late, 14. 



Functions of government, 120 : 
distributions of in U. S. 
government, 123. 

GENETIC, origin of Civil so- 
ciety, 108. 

Good, 29; perfective, delect- 
able, useful, 29 ; real, ap- 
parent, moral. 30 ; supreme. 
31 ; proximate norm of, 31 ; 
ultimate norm of, 32; de- 
terminants of. 32. 

Government, subject of, 116 ; 
the right of, 118. 

HABIT, of thought, of con- 
duct, 9, 56. 

Health, duties regarding, 64. 
70, 78. 

Hereditary succession. 82. 

Historical origin of civil so- 
ciety. 108. 

Historical facts, at basis of 
ownership, 81, 85. 

Honor, duties regarding, 65. 
77. 

IMMORTALITY, essential and 
natural. 15; the latter an 
Ethical postulate, 15. 

Industrial societv, the norms 
of, 104. 

Intenion, 18. 

JUDGEMENT. Ehical, three- 
fold, 21. 

Judicial functions of govern- 
ment, 121. 

Juridical origin of civil soci- 
ety. 109. 

Juridical principles of owner- 
ship. 81. 

Justice. 53. 57. 

KILLING of self, direct and 
indirect. 67: of others in 
self-defence. 77. 



INDEX. 



139 



LABOR, title to ownership, 
82 ; error of Marx regarding 
value of, 83 ; kinds of, 104 ; 
not a mere market commod- 
ity, 105. 

Law, 35; Ethical, physical, 
theoretic, 35; moral and po- 
sitive, 35 ; international,, 135. 
See Moral and Civil Law. 

Liberalism and the church, 
125. 

Liking. 18. 

Lying, true and false notions 
of, 71 ; intrinsic malice of, 
72. 

Love of self, a duty, 63; its 
excess and defect, 63 ; recon- 
ciliation with love of others, 
03, 75. 

MATERIAL goods, positively 
and negatively common, 79 ; 
connatural rights to, 80 ; ac- 
quired rights to. 80. See 
Ownership, Titles. 

Material prosperity, conditions 
of, 85. 

Merit, 43 ; by right and by 
work, 43 ; between man and 
man; with God, 45. 

Monopoly, 87 ; socia 1 and nat- 
ural, 89; when lawful, 90; 
when unlawful, 91. 

Morality, determinants of, 32 ; 
incomplete and complete, 21. 

Moral law, exists. 36 ; its 
source, 35, 36 ; imposed by 
the Divine Will, 39 ; princi- 
ples of, in three classes. 40 ; 
first principles of neces- 
sarily known, 39. 

Motive, 23 

Mutilation of self, (il. 70: of 
others, 78. 



NATION, 111. 

Necessity, physical, emotive. 

moral, 13; of specification. 

of actuation, 14. 
Neighbor, rights of, and duties 

to, 75, 76, 77. 
Norm of goodness, proximate. 

31 ; ultimate, 32. 

OCCUPANCY, title to owner- 
ship, 82. 

Obligation, involves three re- 
lations, 34. See Parental 
and Civil Societies. 

Origin of the State. 108. 

Oughtness, 8 ; various senses 
of, 19 ; Ethical sense of, 20 ; 
analysis of, 20; implies rule 
and law, 21; formal princi- 
ple of Ethics, 21. 

Ownership, 80 ; origin of. his- 
torical and juridical. 81 ; in- 
cludes proprietorship and 
usufruct. 80. 

PARENTAL society, purpose 
of, 100 ; bond of, 100 ; au- 
thority in. 101. 

People, 111. 

Postulates of Ethics, 12 ; cos- 
mological, 12 ; psychological. 
13 ; anthropological, 16. 

Private well-being and the 
state, 114, 122. 

Property, right of. 80, 81. 

Prudence, 58. 

Purpose, 23; correlative of 
motive for created wills, 21. 
See End. 

RELIGION, emotional and 
rational meaning of, 59 ; the- 
oretic and practical, objec- 
tive and subjective, 59. See 
Worship. 



140 



INDEX. 



R epres entative government, 
122; suited to the political 
temperament of modern 
peoples, 123. 

Repute, 65, 77. 

Revelation, natural and di- 
vine, 62; divine, not impos- 
sible, 62; obligation of be- 
lieving, 62. 

Riches, 66; the duty of the 
rich, 66. 

Right, three senses of, 34; ob- 
jective right, an ideal norm 
obligatory in character, 34 ; 
subjective right, notions in- 
volved, 51 ; origin of, 51 ; cor- 
relatives, 52 ; merely Ethical, 
juridical, perfect, coactive, 
53 ; divisions of, 53 ; exer- 
cise of, 54. 

SANCTION, 47 ; intrinsic pur- 
pose of, primary and secon- 
dary, 47; perfect, its quali- 
ties, 48 ; orders of, 48 ; of 
this life, 49 ; of future life, 
49. 

Scandal, of the little ones, 
pharasaical, direct and in- 
direct, 75. 

Science, 9 ; speculative, prac- 
tical, normative, 10. 

Secret, natural, of promise, of 
trust, sacramental, 72 ; duty 
of keeping, and means of, 
73. 

Single-tax socialism, 86. 

Socialism, economic, 84 ; Marx- 
ian basis of, 84; disproof 
of, 85; scientific, 86; phil- 
osophy of, materialistic, 87 ; 
political, leads to democratic 
absolutism, 87. 



Society. 92 ; material and for- 
mal element of, 93 ; parti- 
tions natural, 93 ; domestic, 
civil, religious, 94. 

Sovereignty, elements of, 133; 
subject of, 133. 

State, 111 ; end of, 113 ; theo- 
ries of State's purpose, 112, 
114; relation between state 
and church, 124 ; personality 
of, 133. 

Subordination, kinds of, 126 ; 
regarding church and state, 
126. 

Suicide, 67 ; malice of, 68. 
Syndicalism, 86. 

TEMPERAMENT, 55. 
Temperance, 58. 
Title, 52 ; to ownership, 82. 
Tolerance of religious cults by 
state, 127. 

"UNION", of church and state, 
94, 127. 

VERACITY, 71 ; true and false 
notions of, 71 ; duty of, 72 ; 
precept of, positive and neg- 
ative, 72. 

Virtues. 58; fundamental, in 
relation to God, to others, 
and to self, 58. 

WISH, 18. 

Wealth, 65; duties regarding, 
66; the product of, 84. 

Worship, 60; divine, 60; duty 
of exterior, 61. 

Wages, distinctive notes of. 
105 ; iron law of, 105 ; norm 
of, from commutative jus- 
tice, 105; from social jus- 
tice, 106.. 



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